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A TOO PERMEATING POLICE SURVEILLANCE:
CONSUMER GENETIC GENEALOGY AND THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT AFTER CARPENTER
Michael I. Selvin*
I. INTRODUCTION
On April 24, 2018, in Sacramento, California police arrested
Joseph James DeAngelo, seventy-two, a grandfather and retired police
officer, believing him to be the long sought-after Golden State Killer.1
DeAngelo is suspected of having committed twelve homicides and
more than fifty rapes, and has been linked to more than 175 crimes.2
Prosecutors in Sacramento have charged him with twenty-six counts
of murder and kidnapping.3
The Golden State Killer, also known as the East Area Rapist,
terrorized the Sacramento County area during his ten-year spree, from
1976 to 1986.4 He wore a mask and bound his victims, beginning first
with single women and moving on to married couples, often raping
women in front of their husbands before killing them both.5 He
* J.D. Candidate, May 2020, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A., Government,
Dartmouth College, June 2007. Special thanks to Professor Kevin Lapp for his invaluable guidance
and feedback throughout the writing process.
1. T.J. Ortenzi, Hunt for Golden State Killer Led Detectives to Hobby Lobby for DNA
Sample, WASH. POST (June 1, 2018, 10:53 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/postnation/wp/2018/06/02/hunt-for-golden-state-killer-led-detectives-to-hobby-lobby-for-dnasample/?utm_term=.f091adc76.
2. Id.; Golden State Killer Suspect Joseph DeAngelo Arrested in Sacramento, ABC7
EYEWITNESS NEWS (Apr. 26, 2018), https://abc7chicago.com/golden-state-killer-joseph-jamesdeangelo-east-area-rapist-arrested/3390783/.
3. Associated Press, DNA Clears Accused Golden State Killer Joseph DeAngelo of 1975
Murder, NBC NEWS (Jan. 9, 2019, 5:37 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/dnaclears-accused-golden-state-killer-joseph-deangelo-1975-murder-n956566. Prosecutors charged
the kidnapping counts because the statute of limitations had run on the rape cases. Id.
4. Golden State Killer Suspect Joseph DeAngelo Charged with 13 Murders, SKY NEWS
(Aug. 24, 2018), https://news.sky.com/story/golden-state-killer-suspect-joseph-deangelo-chargedwith-13-murders-11480597.
5. Thomas Fuller, How a Genealogy Site Led to the Front Door of the Golden State Killer,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/26/us/golden-state-killer.html.
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abruptly ended his spree, investigators believe, in 1986.6 It is unclear
why.7
Police had recovered DNA evidence belonging to the perpetrator
of numerous crimes now linked to DeAngelo, but at the time could not
match the samples to any suspects. 8 The case went cold for four
decades, but investigators had not given up.9 Sacramento cold case
detective Paul Holes hired Barbara Rae-Venter, a retired patent
attorney from California who made a hobby of helping adopted people
find their birth parents using commercial genealogy websites.10
Investigators created a profile of the unknown perpetrator’s DNA and
uploaded the profile to GEDmatch, an online commercial genealogy
database intended to allow users to upload their own genetic profiles
and search for unknown relatives.11 Rae-Venter ran a search of the
suspected perpetrator’s DNA profile against the nearly one million
user profiles then comprising GEDmatch’s database,12 and identified
several users who were third cousins of the source of the cold case
DNA.13
Holes and Rae-Venter then started building family trees around
these third cousins, attempting to find a common ancestor.14 In all, it
took a team of five investigators four months to identify DeAngelo.15
Finding a common ancestor proved difficult, as many of the suspect’s
6. Justin Jouvenal, To Find Alleged Golden State Killer, Investigators First Found His GreatGreat-Great-Grandparents, WASH. POST (Apr. 30, 2018, 3:22 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/to-find-alleged-golden-state-killerinvestigators-first-found-his-great-great-great-grandparents/2018/04/30/3c865fe7-dfcc-4a0eb6b2-0bec548d501f_story.html.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Heather Murphy, She Helped Crack the Golden State Killer Case. Here’s What She’s
Going to Do Next, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 29, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/29/science/ba
rbara-rae-venter-gsk.html.
11. See id.
12. As of November 2019, the GEDmatch database had 1.3 million user profiles. Kashmir Hill
& Heather Murphy, Your DNA Profile Is Private? A Florida Judge Just Said Otherwise, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 5, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/05/business/dna-database-searchwarrant.html?smid=nytcore-ios-share (last updated Dec. 30, 2019).
13. Jocelyn Kaiser, We Will Find You: DNA Search Used to Nab Golden State Killer Can
Home in on About 60% of White Americans, SCI. MAG. (Oct. 11, 2018, 2:00 PM),
https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2018/10/we-will-find-you-dna-search-used-nab-golden-statekiller-can-home-about-60-white.
14. Murphy, She Helped Crack the Golden State Killer Case, supra note 10.
15. Jouvenal, supra note 6.
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relatives were recent Italian immigrants, preventing the team from
tracing their lineages farther back.16 The team had more success
investigating relatives on the English side of the identified individuals’
lineages and eventually was able to formulate rough family trees.17
Utilizing birth and death certificates, marriage records, social
media profiles, census data, and news stories, Rae-Venter and her
team eventually traced twenty-five family trees back to a common
ancestor, a great-great-great grandparent of both the GEDmatch users
identified in the search and the source of the forensic DNA.18 They
then worked forward from the common ancestor, looking for relatives
in the lineage who fit the profile of the Golden State Killer based on
his approximate age when the crimes were committed and his
residency in or near Sacramento.19
Numerous suspects emerged, including DeAngelo.20 Rae-Venter
used a DNA analytics tool on GEDmatch that predicted the killer’s
DNA likely belonged to someone with blue eyes.21 She also used a
health risk analysis website called Promethease.com to determine that
the suspect likely began balding prematurely.22 Of the suspects RaeVenter’s team had honed in on, only DeAngelo had blue eyes and a
receding hairline.23
Sacramento detectives then surveilled DeAngelo’s home for three
days.24 On April 18, 2018, they followed him to a Hobby Lobby store
in Roseville, California.25 While he was in the store, investigators
swabbed the handle of his car for DNA and sent it to the crime lab.26
They also removed a tissue from his garbage and sent it to a crime lab
for DNA testing.27 Both samples matched DNA collected from the
scene of a rape and murder in 1980 that was long suspected of having
been committed by the Golden State Killer.28 Police arrested
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Murphy, She Helped Crack the Golden State Killer Case, supra note 10.
Id.
Id.; Jouvenal, supra note 6.
Jouvenal, supra note 6.
Id.
Murphy, She Helped Crack the Golden State Killer Case, supra note 10.
Id.
Id.
Ortenzi, supra note 1.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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DeAngelo days later, and a DNA sample taken upon arrest matched
more than ten cold case murders in California.29
Whether genetic genealogical investigations utilizing commercial
databases by law enforcement implicate the Fourth Amendment’s
prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures is an open question.
Indeed, it is difficult to neatly apply traditional Fourth Amendment
doctrine to the technique to even determine whether such
investigations would qualify as searches subject to the Fourth
Amendment. Under the traditional third-party doctrine, databased
individuals would not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their
genetic data voluntarily uploaded to publicly available databases.30
But what about the relatives of these individuals, both the intermediate
relatives on a given family tree between the database user and the
source of the forensic DNA sample, and the suspect ultimately
identified by the investigation? Genetic information is shared amongst
relatives, and in a given investigation, genetic and other highly
intimate personal information is revealed. Does the technique
constitute a search of database users’ relatives who did not voluntarily
provide their genetic information to any database? And as the use of
this method of investigation continues to grow, with no guidelines and
little oversight,31 what safeguards and limits should be imposed?
This Note begins with an explanation of how genetic genealogical
investigations are conducted and discusses the technique’s rapid
development and use in criminal investigations nationwide after
DeAngelo’s arrest was announced. Part III provides an overview of
traditional uses of DNA in criminal investigations utilizing the FBI’s
Combined DNA Index System (CODIS): direct-match searching and
the more controversial, and less widely accepted, partial-match
familial searching. Part III further explains why the constitutional
underpinnings of CODIS do not apply to commercial genetic
genealogical investigations. Part IV considers whether genetic
genealogical investigations would be considered constitutional
searches under traditional Fourth Amendment doctrine and under the
29. Fuller, supra note 5.
30. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979) (“[A] person has no legitimate
expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.”).
31. Sarah Zhang, The Messy Consequences of the Golden State Killer Case, ATLANTIC
(Oct. 1, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2019/10/genetic-genealogy-dnadatabase-criminal-investigations/599005/.
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Supreme Court’s recent decision in Carpenter v. United States.32
Assuming that genetic genealogical investigations are constitutional
searches, Part IV then discusses whether such searches are lawful and
under what circumstances. Last, Part V argues that effective
legislation must be enacted to place limits on law enforcement use of
the technique and highlights a number of factors and policy
considerations that must be carefully weighed and considered in
crafting any such legislation.
II. BACKGROUND
A. GEDmatch
Amongst commercial genealogy websites, GEDmatch has
emerged as law enforcement’s favorite for criminal investigations.33 It
functions differently than its higher profile counterparts, such as
Ancestry and 23andMe.34 Ancestry and 23andMe prohibit use of their
services by law enforcement entirely,35 whereas GEDmatch currently
allows law enforcement to search profiles of consenting users for
certain crimes and until recently granted law enforcement access to all
user profiles to investigate violent crimes.36 And the process by which
an Ancestry or 23andMe user creates his or her DNA profile makes
these sites more difficult for law enforcement to utilize than
GEDmatch.37 Most DNA testing services require users to mail in a
sample of their saliva in a standardized container, which the service
then analyzes in its own lab to create a DNA profile that is uploaded
to the site.38 It would be difficult for law enforcement to utilize such

32. 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
33. Heather Murphy, How an Unlikely Family History Website Transformed Cold Case
Investigations, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/15/science/gedmatch-genealogy-cold-cases.html.
34. Fuller, supra note 5.
35. Kate Snow & Jon Schuppe, ‘This is Just the Beginning’: Using DNA and Genealogy to
Crack Years-Old Cold Cases, NBC NEWS (July 18, 2018, 1:30 AM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/just-beginning-using-dna-genealogy-crack-years-oldcold-cases-n892126.
36. Zhang, supra note 31.
37. Murphy, How an Unlikely Family History Website Transformed Cold Case Investigations,
supra note 33.
38. Fuller, supra note 5.

(10) 53.4_SELVIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1020

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

8/2/20 6:50 PM

[Vol. 53:1015

services because they will not accept blood or semen samples,39 crime
scene evidence, or DNA profiles generated in other labs.40
GEDmatch, based out of a small house in Florida owned by one
of its founders, functions very differently.41 It has no lab.42 Instead, it
allows users to upload DNA profiles generated elsewhere, without
regard for the DNA’s source or the reliability of the labs in which
DNA profiles were originally tested.43 GEDmatch is different from its
competitors in that it is not a DNA testing service, but a publicly
searchable database that allows users who have had their DNA
analyzed elsewhere to more deeply investigate their ancestry.44
GEDmatch is also better equipped than other services for criminal
investigations due to the technology employed by the site itself.
GEDmatch analyzes autosomal DNA single nucleotide
polymorphisms, which are passed down by both males and females
along all ancestral lines.45 This type of DNA data allows for
comparison of any two individuals regardless of how they are
related.46 GEDmatch searches hundreds of thousands of DNA
markers, looking for long stretches that match, thus indicating familial
ties.47 GEDmatch allows users to see precisely where these segments
of their DNA overlap with those of their relatives and to what extent.48
In this way, a user can determine not only to whom on the site they are
related, but how.49 GEDmatch can consistently match relatives as
distant as third cousins and, to a professionally trained genealogist,
convey crucial information regarding how they are related.50 A recent
39. See id.
40. See Murphy, How an Unlikely Family History Website Transformed Cold Case
Investigations, supra note 33.
41. Id.
42. See id.
43. Fuller, supra note 5.
44. Murphy, How an Unlikely Family History Website Transformed Cold Case Investigations,
supra note 33.
45. How Genetic Genealogy Works, PARABON NANOLABS, https://snapshot.parabonnanolabs.com/intro#genealogy-how (last visited Apr. 5, 2020); see Concepts—CentiMorgans
SNPs and Pickin’ Crab, DNAEXPLAINED, https://dna-explained.com/2016/03/30/conceptscentimorgans-snps-and-pickin-crab/ (last visited Apr. 5, 2020).
46. How Genetic Genealogy Works, supra note 45.
47. Id.
48. Murphy, How an Unlikely Family History Website Transformed Cold Case Investigations,
supra note 33.
49. Id.
50. Id.
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study determined that the technology could narrow down the identity
of an anonymous source of DNA to less than twenty potential
individuals in a database of 1.3 million utilizing nothing but the
sample and an approximate age.51
B. Genealogy Experts
While GEDmatch’s analytics are highly effective, the data it
provides are relatively useless for solving cold cases without the
assistance of a trained genealogy expert.52 One such expert, CeCe
Moore of Parabon Nanolabs, has recently emerged among the experts
most commonly used by law enforcement and, following numerous
television and press interviews, has become a public face of genetic
genealogy criminal investigations.53
Parabon Nanolabs is based out of Reston, Virginia, and is
comprised of roughly twenty employees.54 In 2011, in conjunction
with the Department of Defense, Parabon developed its first program
to assist law enforcement in cold case investigations.55 Parabon’s lab
would analyze cold case DNA samples to create computer-generated
sketches of what their owners might look like.56 Hundreds of police
departments signed up for the service.57 As the program continued to
grow, Parabon developed technology to analyze and compare
autosomal DNA from samples submitted to its lab in an effort to
identify people based on distant relatives.58 Following the publicity
surrounding Joseph DeAngelo’s arrest as the Golden State Killer,
Parabon hired Moore, a traditional genealogist, and began offering its
services to police departments to employ the same genetic genealogy
investigative techniques used to identify DeAngelo to solve other cold
cases. 59
51. Kaiser, supra note 13.
52. Murphy, How an Unlikely Family History Website Transformed Cold Case Investigations,
supra note 33.
53. Snow & Schuppe, supra note 35.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Megan Molteni, The Future of Crime-Fighting Is Family Tree Forensics, WIRED (Dec. 26,
2018, 8:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/the-future-of-crime-fighting-is-family-treeforensics/.
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Police departments send cold case DNA samples to Parabon,
which processes the samples in its lab and creates autosomal DNA
profiles in a format compatible with GEDmatch.60 Parabon uploads
these profiles to GEDmatch, and Moore searches the database for
relatives.61 As in the Golden State Killer investigation, Moore builds
family trees of each identified relative backward in time until she finds
a common ancestor, using public records such as marriage and birth
certificates, obituaries, social media profiles, census records and news
articles.62 She then works forward until she arrives at potential
suspects in the family lineage that fit the perpetrator’s profile.63 These
suspects are then given to the police to investigate further.64
While the initial investigation of DeAngelo took thousands of law
enforcement man-hours, the process has been refined and streamlined,
and is rapidly becoming much more efficient.65 Parabon has said it
finds partial matches to cold case DNA samples on GEDmatch in 60
percent of its cases and expects that rate to grow as more people upload
their genetic profiles to the site.66
C. Aftermath of the Golden State Killer Case
In just over a year, use of this technique by law enforcement has
grown at exponential rates.67 Parabon has helped solve numerous cold
cases in recent months, including the 1988 murder of an eight-yearold girl in Indiana, the 1987 killing of a couple in Washington, and the
1992 homicide of a woman in Pennsylvania.68 Genealogists have
identified over forty cold case suspects since Joseph DeAngelo.69
The technique has become much more efficient as well,
producing results at ever-increasing speed. In September, 2018,
Sacramento police identified Roy Charles Waller as the suspect in the
commission of ten unsolved rapes by uploading his DNA profile to
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Snow & Schuppe, supra note 35.
64. Id.
65. Murphy, How an Unlikely Family History Website Transformed Cold Case Investigations,
supra note 33; Murphy, She Helped Crack the Golden State Killer Case, supra note 10.
66. Snow & Schuppe, supra note 35.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Zhang, supra note 31.
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GEDmatch and identifying a close relative.70 His arrest was only the
fifteenth instance GEDmatch was used to solve a cold case following
DeAngelo’s arrest,71 and investigators identified Waller as their
suspect within mere hours of uploading his DNA to GEDmatch.72
Yet the widespread use of the technique by law enforcement, with
little formal oversight, has sparked user backlash and bitter debate
within the genealogical community.73 User backlash caused by
GEDmatch’s decision to break its own terms of service led it to
overhaul its policy regarding law enforcement use of the database
entirely.74 Prior to May 18, 2019, GEDmatch’s terms of service
disclosed to its users that it accepted “DNA obtained and authorized
by law enforcement to either: (1) identify a perpetrator of a violent
crime against another individual; or (2) identify remains of a deceased
individual.”75 GEDmatch defined “violent crime” as “homicide or
sexual assault.”76 However, in November 2018, GEDmatch allowed
law enforcement access to investigate a lesser crime.77 Detectives in
Centerville, Utah were investigating the attack of a seventy-one-yearold woman, who was choked by her assailant until she lost
consciousness but survived.78 She was not sexually assaulted. 79 When
Parabon informed the detectives they could not upload the DNA found
at the scene to GEDmatch because the attack did not constitute a
violent crime under GEDmatch’s terms of service, the detectives
approached Curtis Rogers of GEDmatch and Steven Armentrout of

70. Murphy, How an Unlikely Family History Website Transformed Cold Case Investigations,
supra note 33.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Zhang, supra note 31.
74. Peter Aldhous, This Genealogy Database Helped Solve Dozens of Crimes. But Its New
Privacy Rules Will Restrict Access by Cops, BUZZFEED NEWS (May 19, 2019, 4:51 PM),
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/peteraldhous/this-genealogy-database-helped-solvedozens-of-crimes-but.
75. GEDMatch.Com Terms of Service and Privacy Policy, GEDMATCH,
https://web.archive.org/web/20190506040926/https://www.gedmatch.com/tos.htm (last visited
May 6, 2019) (version prior to May 18, 2019 update).
76. Id.
77. Pat Reavy, Plastic Milk Container, Genealogy Helped Utah Police Crack Church Assault
Case, KSL.COM (May 13, 2019, 3:42 PM), https://www.ksl.com/article/46551323/plastic-milkcontainer-genealogy-helped-utah-police-crack-church-assault-case.
78. Id.
79. See id.
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Parabon for permission.80 They consented, and Parabon’s genealogists
were able to trace the DNA sample to a great-uncle of the source and
ultimately to the source himself.81 In April 2019, he was arrested and
charged with aggravated assault and aggravated burglary.82
Mere days after news broke of the Utah investigation, user
backlash caused GEDmatch to revise its terms of service.83 It now
allows law enforcement to upload DNA “to identify a perpetrator of a
violent crime against another individual, where ‘violent crime’ is
defined as murder, nonnegligent manslaughter, aggravated rape,
robbery, or aggravated assault.”84 However, GEDmatch created new
privacy settings for its DNA profiles. Users’ profiles are all set to
private by default, restricting their data from ever being found in a
search. They can then choose to change their privacy preference to
“Public + opt-out,” in which “DNA data is [sic] available for
comparison to any Raw Data in the GEDmatch database, except DNA
kits identified as being uploaded for law enforcement purposes,” or to
“Public + opt-in,” allowing for matches to DNA uploaded by law
enforcement.85
Because all GEDmatch users now have to affirmatively opt-in,
many profiles are beyond law enforcement’s reach, greatly
diminishing the efficacy of the technique, at least for now. Thus far,
only 185,000 of GEDmatch’s 1.3 million users have chosen to optin,86 greatly hindering its utility in criminal investigations.87 While this
approach may temporarily allay concerns about law enforcement
intrusion into millions of people’s private genetic information, it
returns some level of control over such information to GEDmatch’s
users only. It does nothing to address the legitimate privacy interests
of the relatives of users who choose to opt-in—millions of people who
80. Peter Aldhous, The Arrest of a Teen on an Assault Charge Has Sparked New Privacy
Fears About DNA Sleuthing, BUZZFEED NEWS (May 14, 2019, 10:15 PM),
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/peteraldhous/genetic-genealogy-parabon-gedmatchassault.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. GEDMatch.Com Terms of Service and Privacy Policy, GEDMATCH,
https://www.gedmatch.com/tos.htm (last updated Dec. 9, 2019).
85. Id.
86. Hill & Murphy, supra note 12.
87. Zhang, supra note 31.
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have never uploaded their DNA to the site, nor consented to have their
genetic information implicated in criminal investigations. Users,
therefore, decide whether or not law enforcement can access not only
their own genetic information, but that of their extended family as
well.
Whether such investigations intrude on the protected Fourth
Amendment interests of these relatives, including relative-suspects
ultimately identified through this technique, is currently an open
question. William Talbott II was convicted in June 2019 of the 1987
murder of a young Canadian couple.88 Investigators identified Mr.
Talbott by utilizing GEDmatch and Parabon, yet his defense attorneys
never challenged the constitutionality of the technique at trial.89
Rachel Forde, Mr. Talbott’s Snohomish County public defender,
stated she felt the evidence was not relevant because police only used
it to generate a lead, not to support probable cause to obtain the arrest
warrant, and it was not introduced at trial.90 Indeed, the technique does
not fit neatly into the traditional Fourth Amendment analytical
framework, nor does the Supreme Court’s reasoning for finding
CODIS searches constitutional apply.
III. FORENSIC DNA IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS
The use of DNA by law enforcement in criminal investigations is
common nationwide. Two techniques utilizing forensic DNA
databases were well established prior to the advent of commercial
genealogy investigations: direct-match searching and partial-match
familial searching. Both utilize CODIS, a software program
authorized by Congress and supervised by the FBI, which allows law
enforcement to search numerous state and national databases of
arrestee DNA profiles.91
88. Heather Murphy, Genealogy Sites Have Helped Identify Suspects. Now They’ve Helped
Convict One, N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/01/us/dna-geneticgenealogy-trial.html.
89. Id.
90. Jason Tashea, Genealogy Sites Give Law Enforcement a New DNA Sleuthing Tool, but the
Battle Over Privacy Looms, A.B.A. J. (Nov. 1, 2019, 4:20 AM),
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/family-tree-genealogy-sites-arm-law-enforcementwith-a-new-branch-of-dna-sleuthing-but-the-battle-over-privacy-looms?ut.
91. Frequently Asked Questions on CODIS and NDIS, FBI,
https://www.fbi.gov/services/laboratory/biometric-analysis/codis/codis-and-ndis-fact-sheet (last
visited Apr. 5, 2020).
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The Supreme Court held the collection of DNA from arrestees
and direct-match searches of CODIS constitutional in Maryland v.
King.92 But the characteristics of direct-match searches the Court
focused on in reaching its holding—that the DNA collected did not
reveal intimate biological information of source individuals,93 and that
the purpose of direct-matching was identification, rather than criminal
investigation94—do not apply to genetic genealogy. Rather, genetic
genealogy more closely resembles partial-match familial searches of
CODIS, an investigative technique only authorized in a handful of
states.95 The Supreme Court has not considered the constitutionality
of partial-match familial searching, and it does not fit neatly into
traditional Fourth Amendment doctrine. Moreover, the most troubling
characteristics of partial-match CODIS searching are further
exacerbated in the context of genetic genealogy investigations, and
thus must inform the analysis of whether genetic genealogical
investigations should be deemed constitutional.
A. Direct-Match Searches Using CODIS
CODIS facilitates searches across the National DNA Index
System (NDIS) and state DNA databases for DNA profiles that match
suspects’ DNA left at a crime scene.96 NDIS is comprised of multiple
databases, including a Convicted Offender or Arrestee Index, and a
Forensic Index.97 CODIS also integrates state indexes, which are
separately maintained pursuant to state law, with varying criteria
determining when arrestees and/or convicted felons must submit their
DNA for inclusion.98
CODIS primarily employs a form of DNA typing known as
single-tandem repeat (STR) typing, which counts and compares repeat
92. 569 U.S. 435 (2013).
93. Id. at 449.
94. Id. at 464.
95. James Rainey, Familial DNA Puts Elusive Killers Behind Bars. But Only 12 States Use It,
NBC NEWS (Apr. 28, 2018, 3:00 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/familial-dnaputs-elusive-killers-behind-bars-only-12-states-n869711.
96. Frequently Asked Questions on CODIS and NDIS, supra note 91.
97. Id.
98. Erin Murphy, Relative Doubt: Familial Searches of DNA Databases, 109 MICH. L. REV.
291, 296 (2010); JULIE E. SAMUELS ET AL., URBAN INST., COLLECTING DNA AT ARREST:
POLICIES, PRACTICES, AND IMPLICATIONS iii (2013),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/242812.pdf.
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sequences at twenty locations, 99 known as “loci,” across a genomic
strand.100 Two of these repeat sequences, known as “alleles,” are
recorded at each locus, yielding forty measurements that comprise the
DNA profile stored in NDIS and state databases.101 All fifty states
collect DNA samples and create profiles based on the same twenty
loci, so as to be compatible with the CODIS software.102
To utilize CODIS in a criminal investigation, law enforcement
first submits a forensic sample of the crime scene DNA to a lab in
order to create a profile based on the alleles at all twenty loci.103
Investigators then upload this profile to CODIS, which runs a query
against the Offender and Forensic Indexes of every state database and
the NDIS, looking for a match.104 If CODIS returns a match, the law
enforcement agency laboratories responsible for creating the queried
profile and the database match communicate to confirm the match,
share identifying information, and coordinate further investigative
steps between the two agencies.105 A match in a Forensic Index would
indicate that there may be a common perpetrator of two separate
crimes.106 A match in an Offender Index would indicate that the
offender of a past crime, or a suspect arrested on suspicion of a past
crime, deposited DNA at the crime scene currently being
investigated.107 In short, “CODIS sets uniform national standards for
DNA matching and then facilitates connections between local law
enforcement agencies who can share more specific information about
matched STR profiles.”108
The Supreme Court considered the Fourth Amendment
implications of warrantless forensic DNA collection in Maryland v.
King.109 The Court held that the mandatory collection of DNA by
means of a buccal swab of a suspect’s inner cheek, when the suspect
99. From its inception in 1998 until December 31, 2016, CODIS profiles recorded thirteen
loci. As of January 1, 2017, CODIS Core Loci now include twenty loci. Frequently Asked Questi
ons on CODIS and NDIS, supra note 91.
100. Murphy, Relative Doubt, supra note 98, at 295.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Frequently Asked Questions on CODIS and NDIS, supra note 91.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 445 (2013).
109. See id.
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had been arrested for a serious offense supported by probable cause,
constituted a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment.110 The
Court determined a buccal swab of the inner cheek to be a search, as
“[v]irtually any ‘intrusio[n] into the human body’” will constitute a
search under the Fourth Amendment.111 When analyzing the
reasonableness of Maryland’s statute, which required the collection of
DNA from suspects arrested and charged with a crime or attempted
crime of violence or burglary, the Court identified and weighed the
government’s interests in collecting and databasing arrestee’s DNA
against the interests of the arrestee, who the Court determined had a
diminished expectation of privacy in police custody.112
The Court identified five discrete governmental interests. First, it
focused on “the need for law enforcement officers in a safe and
accurate way to process and identify the persons and possessions they
must take into custody.”113 The Court likened the collection of a DNA
sample for identification purposes to both fingerprint identification of
arrestees and to the comparison of a person’s face to a wanted poster
of an unidentified suspect.114 “Finding occurrences of the arrestee’s
CODIS profile in outstanding cases is consistent with this common
practice. It uses a different form of identification than a name or
fingerprint, but its function is the same.”115
Second, the Court recognized the state’s interest in identifying the
suspect and linking him to past crimes as a means of identifying his
propensity for violence and the resulting danger his custody may pose
for law enforcement in charge of holding him.116 Third, the Court
pointed to the state’s interest in ensuring the suspect shows up for trial
and in making decisions regarding his bail, by linking the suspect to
past unsolved crimes while still in police custody.117 Fourth, the Court
determined that discovery of past crimes through DNA matching can
alert a court of an arrestee’s propensity for violence that could pose a

110. Id. at 465–66.
111. Id. at 446 (second alteration in original) (quoting Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757,
770 (1966)).
112. Id. at 461–62.
113. Id. at 449.
114. Id. at 445, 451–52.
115. Id. at 452.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 453.
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danger to the public, further informing bail determinations.118 Last, the
Court noted that connecting an arrestee with a past crime may “have
the salutary effect of freeing a person wrongfully imprisoned for the
same offense.”119
The Court weighed these interests against the “degree to which
the search invades an [arrestee’s] legitimate expectations of
privacy.”120 It looked at both the invasiveness of the inner cheek
buccal swab, which it determined was a negligible intrusion,121 and an
arrestee’s diminished expectation of privacy.122 The Court emphasized
that “the necessary predicate of a valid arrest for a serious offense is
fundamental.”123 Thus, the Court held that the taking of DNA by
buccal swab from an arrestee with a diminished expectation of privacy
was “[a] brief intrusion . . . subject to the Fourth Amendment, but a
swab of this nature [did] not increase the indignity already attendant
to normal incidents of arrest,” and was therefore reasonable when
weighed against the significant government interests previously
identified.124
The Court deemed the initial collection of the DNA sample to be
the search that triggered the Fourth Amendment, and hastily dismissed
the implications of law enforcement’s analysis and conversion of the
sample into a profile that could then be searched across all CODISlinked databases after the DNA was collected.125 The Court reasoned
that “the processing of respondent’s DNA sample’s 13 CODIS loci
did not intrude on respondent’s privacy in a way that would make his
DNA identification unconstitutional”126 because the genetic
information recorded at these loci does not code for specific proteins
capable of revealing hereditary traits but rather can only be used for
identification purposes; the Court labeled this genetic information
“junk.”127 Importantly, the Court emphasized that “[i]f in the future
police analyze samples to determine, for instance, an arrestee’s
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id.
Id. at 455.
Id. at 461.
Id. at 446.
Id. at 462.
Id. at 461
Id. at 464.
See id. at 464–65.
Id. at 464.
Id. at 445.
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predisposition for a particular disease or other hereditary factors not
relevant to identity, that case would present additional privacy
concerns not present here.”128
Because the DNA analysis revealed no personal medical or
hereditary information, and the CODIS search was likened to a search
of fingerprint records for purely identification purposes, the King
Court found such searches constitutional even in the absence of
individualized suspicion and a warrant. In reaching this conclusion,
however, the Court completely ignored the purpose for which CODIS
searches are most often performed: to find and identify suspects of
unsolved crimes.129 Justice Scalia, in dissent, repeatedly stressed the
Maryland statute’s true purpose—ordinary criminal investigation and
evidence-gathering—which he argued is always prohibited by the
Fourth Amendment absent individualized suspicion.130 He argued that
a reasonableness inquiry should only be undertaken if the
suspicionless search was performed for a government purpose other
than solving crimes, under the special needs doctrine.131 “No matter
the degree of invasiveness, suspicionless searches are never allowed
if their principal end is ordinary crime-solving.”132 Because the
arrestee’s DNA would be searched against a database of forensic DNA
from unsolved crimes for which he was not a suspect, Justice Scalia
argued, such a search should be prohibited by the Fourth Amendment
without a warrant.133 Scalia warned in dissent that the ramifications of
the majority’s decision would be that “your DNA can be taken and
entered into a national DNA database if you are ever arrested, rightly
or wrongly, and for whatever reason.”134 The Court did not address
this fear, however, instead accepting the argument that the primary

128. Id. at 464–65.
129. Id. at 474–75 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 466.
131. Id. at 468.
132. Id. at 469 (emphasis in original).
133. Id. at 480–81.
134. Id. at 481. While widespread collection of DNA by law enforcement for minor crimes has
not come to pass in the ensuing six years since King, the rapid increase of commercial genealogy
databases in criminal investigations, the extremely wide net such searches can cast, and the detailed
information such databases provide, are creating an ad hoc national database by association that,
combined with law enforcement’s use of genealogical investigative techniques, may become even
more potent than the national DNA database Scalia feared.
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purpose of CODIS was identification, rather than criminal
investigation and thus finding it constitutional.
B. Partial Match Familial Searching
While direct-match searches utilizing CODIS are widespread and
common throughout all fifty states and various federal law
enforcement agencies, partial-match familial DNA searching (FDS) is
far rarer and more controversial. A CODIS query can be set to high,
medium, or low stringency, determining how many loci must match
for the system to yield a “matching” profile.135 A high level stringency
query requires all twenty loci to match, indicating the unidentified
DNA sample originated from the same person whose profile the
CODIS query returned. But moderate and low level stringency queries
will return profile results that only match some of the loci, indicating
that the person from whom the unidentified DNA originated is a
relative of the CODIS DNA profile that the query returned.136 But the
CODIS software is not designed for FDS, and it fails to take into
account that certain combinations of genetic information on certain
alleles at each loci are more common in the general population than
others.137 As a result, some states have developed software for
intentional familial searching that further analyzes partial matches to
determine the probabilities that certain allelic matches indicate
familial relationships, based upon their relative scarcity in the general
public.138 Matches of common allelic combinations have a lower
chance of indicating familial relationships than matches of rarer
combinations.139
Twelve states explicitly allow FDS by law enforcement,140 while
six states explicitly prohibit it.141 Maryland and the District of
135. SARA DEBUS-SHERRILL & MICHAEL B. FIELD, NAT’L CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFERENCE
SERV., UNDERSTANDING FAMILIAL DNA SEARCHING: POLICIES, PROCEDURES AND POTENTIAL
IMPACT 3 (2017), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/251043.pdf.
136. Id.
137. Murphy, Relative Doubt, supra note 98, at 300.
138. Id. at 302–03.
139. Id. at 295, 343–44.
140. Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Minnesota, New York, Ohio, Texas, Utah,
Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Illinois and Louisiana are currently considering legislation.
Rainey, supra note 95.
141. Murphy, Relative Doubt, supra note 98, at 302; Natalie Ram, Incidental Informants:
Police Can Use Genealogy Databases to Help Identify Criminal Relatives—but Should They?, MD.
B. J., July–Aug. 2018, at 8, 11–12.
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Columbia have enacted statutes banning the practice, and the rest do
so through regulations or law enforcement policy.142 The remaining
states take a more flexible non-statutory approach, often allowing
“unintentional” partial match reporting but not intentional familial
searching, a distinction some have criticized as a merely rhetorical
attempt to allow the practice while avoiding public criticism and
controversy.143 While the FBI does not allow familial searching of
NDIS, it does allow moderate stringency searches, which can be
effective in finding matches to forensic samples that contain more than
one person’s DNA.144
Although the constitutionality of familial DNA searching has
been widely debated, it has yet to be decided by courts. Nationally,
FDS is quite uncommon.145 California, for example, explicitly allows
it, yet when cases that utilized FDS to generate leads have gone to trial
there, prosecutors generally have not introduced the results of these
searches into evidence, and defense attorneys have not challenged the
legality of the practice.146 A recent case study of FDS policies in
California noted:
Interviewees147 generally expressed confidence that an FDS
case would be treated like a regular CODIS DNA match case
and that the use of FDS would not likely be raised in court.
Interviewees explained that FDS is just another investigative
tool for law enforcement and, as with any other tool, is not
explicitly brought up in court unless the defense raises it as
an issue (most likely during pre-trial motions). Interviewees
also argued that FDS cases are no different than any other
case dealing with DNA and do not raise any unique 4th

142. Murphy, Relative Doubt, supra note 98, at 302; Ram, supra note 141, at 11.
143. Murphy, Relative Doubt, supra note 98, at 341.
144. Frequently Asked Questions on CODIS and NDIS, supra note 91.
145. See Rainey, supra note 95 (“The practice remains so uncommon that experts aren’t sure
how many detectives and prosecutors are even aware DNA can provide an indirect pathway to
suspects.”).
146. MICHAEL B. FIELD ET AL., NAT’L CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFERENCE S ERV., STUDY OF
FAMILIAL DNA SEARCHING: POLICIES AND PRACTICES 19, 21 (2017),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/251081.pdf.
147. Eighteen stakeholders were interviewed in California, encompassing representatives of
state and local crime labs, the police, prosecutors, the judiciary, a civil liberties attorney, a victim’s
advocate and policy staff. Id. at 2.
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Amendment questions compared to traditional DNA
cases. 148
And yet the constitutionality of familial DNA searching has been
widely debated by legal scholars. The shared nature of DNA between
genetic relatives causes familial DNA searches to “frustrate ordinary
principles of Fourth Amendment analysis.”149 There tends to be
agreement amongst scholars that FDS would likely be permissible
under traditional Fourth Amendment doctrine, but perhaps only
because “familial searches fall between the cracks of a range of
uncertain constitutional doctrines with regard to even the most
preliminary question of whether the Fourth Amendment applies.”150
First, there is the unclear preliminary question of whose privacy
interests would be violated in an FDS case—the databased arrestee,
his or her relatives, or both.151 The source of an indexed DNA profile,
an arrestee, could not assert a Fourth Amendment challenge, as the
arrestee would have been lawfully profiled and indexed under King,
based on the arrestee’s diminished expectation of privacy.152
Moreover, querying the CODIS-linked databases for the purpose of
identification was held not to be a search subject to the Fourth
Amendment by the King Court, despite the issue being given relatively
little attention by the majority and vigorously opposed by the
dissent.153 Indeed, the Supreme Court has never considered a database
query to be a constitutional event.154
Assessing the Fourth Amendment interests of the relatives of the
databased individual is more difficult. Unlike an offender whose DNA
profile was collected while in custody and subsequently searched by
CODIS, the offender’s relatives’ expectation of privacy is not
diminished due to an arrest. The overlap of their DNA with that of
their offender-relative is the result of “biology, not choice. Indeed,
genetic ties are both involuntary and immutable. They cannot be

148. Id. at 19.
149. Ram, supra note 141, at 10.
150. Murphy, Relative Doubt, supra note 98, at 334.
151. Id. at 334–35.
152. See Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 464–65 (2013).
153. See generally id. at 464–82 (majority opinion and Scalia, J., dissenting).
154. See Emily Berman, When Database Queries Are Fourth Amendment Searches, 102 MINN.
L. REV. 577, 603–04 (2017).
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controlled or escaped.”155 It is unclear, however, if such relatives even
have a privacy interest being infringed.156 The profile used to conduct
the CODIS search is not derived from their cells.157 Further, it is
unclear what harm, if any, these relatives suffer, and whether such
harm results from a violation of their Fourth Amendment rights.158
Because the genetic information stored in CODIS databases is
comprised of identifying “junk” only, FDS does not implicate
information nearly as intimately personal as does genetic genealogy
investigations. And because FDS cannot identify relatives as far
removed as GEDmatch can, these investigations do not involve trained
genealogists constructing extensive family trees. Accordingly, FDS is
significantly less intrusive than genetic genealogy. Thus, it is difficult
to imagine what injury the relatives of databased individuals might
suffer. Simply casting temporary suspicion on these individuals,
absent more, is unlikely to be deemed intrusive enough to trigger
Fourth Amendment protections.
Nevertheless, some argue familial DNA searches should be
prohibited because “they embody the very presumptions that our
constitutional and evidentiary rules have long endeavored to
counteract: guilt by association, racial discrimination, propensity, and
even biological determinism.”159 Professor Erin Murphy argues the
constitutional focus should be on the use and further searching of
lawfully collected DNA samples, rather than on the initial collection
of the sample.160 Murphy has articulated one such hypothetical view a
court could take to find a familial DNA search to violate the Fourth
Amendment:
The partial match search itself constitutes the unauthorized
act. Its unreasonableness would hinge upon the arbitrariness
of casting suspicion on offender relatives, as well as the
impermissibility of exploiting databases compiled on the
premise of lessened privacy of offenders to access the fully
protected DNA profiles of relatives. . . . In stark terms: the
partial match search, and the inference drawn from the match
itself, invoke constitutional scrutiny because they intrude on
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Ram, supra note 141, at 11.
Id.
Id.
Murphy, Relative Doubt, supra note 98, at 334.
Id. at 304.
Id. at 335–36.
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the legitimate expectation of privacy held by the relative in
her half of the offender’s genetic code, and are impermissible
because they do so without individualized or particularized
suspicion. The rationale justifying such warrantless,
suspicionless searches in the case of a direct match—namely,
the diminished expectation of privacy and recidivist threat of
convicted offenders—is absent when it comes to relatives,
who retain the full force of Fourth Amendment protection.161
Not all agree with Professor Murphy’s formulation, however.
Rather, FDS could be framed as nothing more than a comparison
between a forensic sample and a lawfully obtained DNA profile, with
the result—that most loci match but a few do not—reported to law
enforcement investigators by their lab technicians.162 The inference
that such a result indicates kinship, and any subsequent investigation
of leads utilizing common and uncontroversial techniques, would not
implicate the Fourth Amendment.163 Absent a violation of a databased
individual’s relative’s Fourth Amendment rights, which the Supreme
Court has held to be “personal,”164 that relative would have no
recourse to address harm caused by the dissemination of intimate
information inferred from the databased individual’s shared genetic
information.165 While courts have yet to weigh in, the view generally
shared by both prosecutors and defendants in the small handful of
cases utilizing the technique that have actually gone to trial, as well as
some legal scholars, is that the Fourth Amendment currently does not
prohibit familial DNA searching.166

161. Id. at 336–37.
162. See, e.g., Jules Epstein, “Genetic Surveillance”—The Bogeyman Response to Familial
DNA Investigations, 2009 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 141, 161.
163. Id. at 161–62.
164. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133–34 (1978).
165. Epstein, supra note 162, at 161–62.
166. Id. at 165; see also FIELD ET AL., supra note 146, at 21.
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IV. COMMERCIAL GENETIC GENEALOGY IN CRIMINAL
INVESTIGATIONS AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
A. Fourth Amendment Analysis Before Carpenter
1. Does a Commercial Genetic Genealogical
Investigation Constitute a Search?
Fourth Amendment analysis of warrantless commercial genetic
genealogy investigations by law enforcement is in many ways akin to
the analysis of FDS—it similarly “frustrate[s] ordinary principles of
Fourth Amendment analysis.”167 However, a stronger argument can
be made that genetic genealogy investigations trigger Fourth
Amendment protections because of the more revealing nature of the
genetic information at issue. The Fourth Amendment protects against
“unreasonable searches and seizures” of one’s “person[], house[],
papers, and effects.”168 Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Katz
v. United States,169 a trespass upon one’s real property or personal
possessions was generally required to constitute a search.170 The Court
abandoned such an approach in Katz, declaring that the “Fourth
Amendment protects people—and not simply ‘areas’—against
unreasonable searches and seizures” and that “the ‘trespass’
doctrine . . . can no longer be regarded as controlling.”171 In finding
the government’s uninvited electronic eavesdropping of a
conversation Katz was having in a public phone booth to be a violation
of his Fourth Amendment rights, the Court established an alternate test
to determine the existence of a protected interest: whether an
individual had “exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of
privacy . . . that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”172
There are three primary steps that comprise a genetic genealogy
investigation, each of which may implicate the Fourth Amendment:
(1) the creation of the database by uploading genetic samples for
analysis and storage as genetic profiles in the database; (2) running a
forensic sample acquired from the crime scene through the database
167. Ram, supra note 141, at 10.
168. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
169. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
170. See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (holding surveillance not
prohibited by the Fourth Amendment absent any trespass or seizure of material object), overruled
in part by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
171. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
172. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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to find relatives, as far out as third cousins, amongst the database’s
users; and (3) the genealogical research and building of family trees,
tracing backward from the users’ profiles identified by the database
query in step two to a common ancestor, and then forward from that
ancestor to identify potential suspects in the crime being investigated.
Because the government did not mandate the collection of the
genetic samples used to create the profiles that comprise commercial
databases, there would be no Fourth Amendment event at the point of
collection (step one) as there would be with new CODIS profile
entries, ruled a constitutional search in King.173 Law enforcement is
not involved in the collection or analysis of any new user’s genetic
sample, nor the derivation of the genetic information from the sample
that allows for the creation of the profile, so the creation of the
database and the addition of new profiles therein would not constitute
a search.
Steps two and three, however, are potentially Fourth Amendment
events. Putting aside for a moment that the users of the database
uploaded their DNA profiles willingly—would the accessing of DNA
profiles already stored in a commercial DNA database, and the
comparison of those profiles against a forensic sample by law
enforcement, constitute a search under traditional Fourth Amendment
doctrine? And would the extensive research through public records,
the press, social media and more, necessary to build the family tree,
constitute its own search, when all such records are public?
The Supreme Court has held the testing of biological samples that
reveal intimate details about the source to be a search independent of
the collection of the sample.174 The Court has declared that one has an
expectation of privacy in confidential information such as private
genetic and medical information, taking into consideration the
sensitivity of information that can be derived from biological
samples,175 and has stated that such “intrusions must be deemed
searches under the Fourth Amendment.”176 And while the Court in
King held that the analysis of the respondent’s DNA was not an
173. Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 465 (2013).
174. Murphy, Relative Doubt, supra note 98, at 335.
175. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 616–17 (1989) (“It is not disputed,
however, that chemical analysis of urine, like that of blood, can reveal a host of private medical
facts about an employee, including whether he or she is epileptic, pregnant, or diabetic.”).
176. Id. at 617.
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unconstitutional intrusion on his privacy, the Court premised its
holding on the fact that the thirteen CODIS loci were noncoding
“junk” that revealed no personal information other than
identification.177 The Court’s reasoning thus indicates that an
individual could have a protected expectation of privacy in their
genetic information if personal information were to be revealed.178
The genetic information being accessed by law enforcement here is
far more revealing than “junk” DNA. It seems to follow, then, that one
has a reasonable expectation of privacy in their genetic information
contained in the records of a commercial genetic genealogy database
such as GEDmatch.
But when law enforcement begins an investigation utilizing
GEDmatch, it is not collecting and analyzing the samples contained
therein, only the cold case sample found at the crime scene. Rather,
they are searching a database that already contains such profiles,
created by the sources of the samples themselves. So courts would
likely follow King and determine that running a sample through
GEDmatch is no different than fingerprint identification, and thus not
a search.179 Indeed, lower courts have held that accessing DNA profile
records using CODIS is not a Fourth Amendment search.180 And the
Supreme Court has never treated database queries generally as Fourth
Amendment events.181 In cases involving databases, the Court has
limited its discussion to either: (a) the constitutionality of the
collection of the information contained therein;182 (b) the adequacy of
statutory safeguards and rules governing disclosure of information;183
or (c) whether law enforcement reliance on mistaken database entries

177. King, 569 U.S. at 464–65.
178. See id. at 464.
179. Id. at 451–52.
180. See, e.g., Johnson v. Quander, 440 F.3d 489, 498 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“We conclude that
accessing the records stored in the CODIS database is not a ‘search’ for Fourth Amendment
purposes. As the Supreme Court has held, the process of matching one piece of personal
information against government records does not implicate the Fourth Amendment.”).
181. Berman, supra note 154, at 604.
182. See, e.g., King, 569 U.S. at 464 (holding collection of DNA from arrestees using buccal
swab constitutional).
183. See generally Erin Murphy, Databases, Doctrine, and Constitutional Criminal Procedure,
37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 803, 811–17 (2010) (discussing Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003), U.S.
Dept. of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. 749 (1989), and Whalen v.
Row, 429 U.S. 589 (1977)).
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should trigger the exclusionary rule.184 Indeed, it is widely accepted
that “the [F]ourth [A]mendment does not control how properly
collected information is deployed.”185 Thus, it is unlikely courts would
find step two, in isolation, to be a search solely because the
information being accessed is more intimate than fingerprint records
or “junk” DNA.
The third step in a genetic genealogy investigation, the
genealogical research and the building of the family tree, is unlikely
to be considered a search when viewed in isolation either. Many of the
genealogists that law enforcement agencies have hired to perform this
step developed their skills conducting genealogy research as a hobby,
helping adopted children find birth parents.186 Using publicly
available information to follow leads and draw inferences is standard,
uncontroversial detective work, and it would be difficult to argue that
society does not expect law enforcement to conduct such
investigations, or considers such investigations unreasonable.
But a plausible argument can be made that when considering the
investigatory technique as a whole—combining genetic information
obtained through a GEDmatch query with a genealogist’s research to
draw a host of inferences—a Fourth Amendment search has occurred.
The Supreme Court acknowledged, in United States v. Jones,187 that
discrete actions by law enforcement that would not rise to the level of
a search in isolation could, in the aggregate, constitute a search,188
often referred to as the mosaic theory. Although the majority’s holding
in Jones—that the use of a GPS device attached to the defendant’s car
to track his movements for twenty-eight days constituted a search—
was based on a traditional trespass theory, five Justices also
determined a search occurred based on the defendant’s reasonable
expectation of privacy.189 This conclusion was not based on a
184. Id. at 817–21 (discussing Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009) and Arizona v.
Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995)).
185. Berman, supra note 154, at 604 (alteration in original) (citing Green v. Berge, 354 F.3d
675, 689 (7th Cir. 2004)); see also Murphy, Databases, Doctrine, and Constitutional Criminal
Procedure, supra note 183, at 821 (“As shown, the Supreme Court has paid scant (and inconsistent)
heed to the peculiar features of databasing or to what special concerns might inform the
investigations conducted or evidence collected from them.”).
186. Murphy, She Helped Crack the Golden State Killer Case, supra note 10.
187. 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
188. See id. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring).
189. See id. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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determination that a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in
any single specific movement, or even in their movements over a short
term, as one’s movements usually occur in public spaces. 190 Rather, it
was based on the effect of combining many discrete location data
points to create a long-term surveillance of one’s movements that
could, when combined with other information, allow inferences to be
drawn regarding “familial, political, professional, religious, and
sexual associations.”191 Combining long-term GPS tracking with
additional publicly available information to make inferences resulted
in “the Government’s unrestrained power to assemble data that reveal
private aspects of identity [that] is susceptible to abuse.”192
Genetic genealogy investigations are no different in this regard.
Erin Murphy’s argument that FDS is a Fourth Amendment search—
that “the partial match search, and the inference drawn from the match
itself, invoke constitutional scrutiny because they intrude on the
legitimate expectation of privacy held by the relative in her half of the
offender’s genetic code”193—is stronger in the context of genetic
genealogy investigations. This is because genetic genealogy profiles
reveal far more intimate information than the identifying “junk” DNA
that comprises the profiles in CODIS databases. In genetic genealogy
investigations, law enforcement learns not only that kinship exists, but
how closely and on which side of the family, and it can draw
inferences about biological characteristics of members of the family
tree based upon the genetic information in the database profiles.194
Because it is unlikely that either step two, the database query, or
step three, the genealogical investigation, would constitute a search
when viewed in isolation, the potential Fourth Amendment search
considered in the following sections will be the overall investigative
technique, combining these two steps into one action that may
constitute a search. Further, this search can run against two classes of
people: the patrons of the genetic genealogy database being queried,
and the family members of any “hits” that a query returns, who are
then investigated in the course of building the family tree, including
the suspect ultimately identified by the investigation.
190. Id. at 416.
191. Id. at 415.
192. Id. at 416.
193. Murphy, Relative Doubt, supra note 98, at 337.
194. Murphy, How an Unlikely Family History Website Transformed Cold Case Investigations,
supra note 33.
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2. Third-Party Doctrine Before Carpenter
Because the genetic information stored by a commercial genetic
genealogy database was submitted voluntarily by its users, and the
subsequent genealogical research is comprised entirely of publicly
available records and information, a genetic genealogy investigation
that might otherwise be considered a search would not implicate the
Fourth Amendment under the third-party doctrine. Under the thirdparty doctrine, articulated by the Supreme Court in United States v.
Miller195 and Smith v. Maryland,196 “a person has no legitimate
expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third
parties.”197 A commercial database’s users, therefore, like those whose
DNA was collected pursuant to an arrest, lack a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the genetic information they have voluntarily
submitted to the database, so law enforcement access of these records
would not constitute a search.
As with FDS, the analysis is less clear when determining whether
a database user’s relatives have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
their DNA that they share with the user, and whether that expectation
of privacy has been intruded upon by investigators. The commercial
database does not actually contain the personal genetic information of
intermediary relatives on the family tree in between the forensic
source DNA and the source’s relatives who have uploaded their DNA
to the database. The database query only produces a record of how
closely the source of the forensic DNA and certain database users are
related and on which branch of their lineage, based on the overlapping
of long stretches of autosomal DNA markers.198 Any intimate
information revealed by the database search pertains directly only to
the users, who relinquished any reasonable expectation of privacy in
such information under the third-party doctrine, and the source of the
forensic sample. Accurate assumptions regarding intermediary
relatives’ biological characteristics can be inferred based on their
location on a lineage between the database user and the forensic
source, but there is not actually a genetic search conducted of any
intermediary relatives.
195.
196.
197.
198.

425 U.S. 435 (1976).
442 U.S. 735 (1979).
Id. at 743–44.
How Genetic Genealogy Works, supra note 45.
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In the aggregate, however, genetic genealogical investigations
delve very deeply into the intimate personal details of many relatives
of the forensic source sample, potentially revealing if an individual
“was born out of wedlock, was the product of incest, or carries genetic
diseases.”199 It is certainly reasonable to expect such information to be
free from government surveillance. The depth and breadth of intimate
personal information at issue, and the speed and efficiency with which
modern technology allows law enforcement to discover and compile
such information, suggest the traditional third-party doctrine should
not apply. As genetic genealogical investigations rapidly become
faster and more efficient, they are beginning to function more akin to
a national genetic database.200 The public’s unease with GEDmatch
violating its terms of service to allow law enforcement access to
investigate an assault in real time clearly demonstrates the need for a
different approach. The Supreme Court’s recent decision in United
States v. Carpenter establishes one such approach to extending Fourth
Amendment protection to certain types of information and
surveillance technologies in the digital age and lays the foundation for
further extensions.
B. Fourth Amendment Analysis After Carpenter
1. Carpenter v. United States
The Supreme Court in Carpenter v. United States upended
traditional third-party doctrine, recognizing that the rapid
development of modern technologies, especially information
technologies, has resulted in the production and storage of extensive,
easily searchable, and highly revealing records by third parties.
Timothy Carpenter had been convicted of multiple armed robberies of
several Radio Shack and T-Mobile stores.201 To prove Carpenter’s
presence at each robbery, prosecutors introduced as evidence 127 days
of cell-site location information (CSLI), which they acquired from
199. Murphy, Genealogy Sites Have Helped Identify Suspects, supra note 88.
200. See Yaniv Erlich et al., Identity Inference of Genomic Data Using Long-Range Familial
Searches, 362 SCI. 690, 690 (Nov. 9, 2018),
https://science.sciencemag.org/content/sci/362/6415/690.full.pdf (predicting 99 percent of
Caucasian Americans of Northern European descent will be identifiable through genetic genealogy
in the near future).
201. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2212–13 (2018).

(10) 53.4_SELVIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

8/2/20 6:50 PM

GENETIC GENEALOGY AFTER CARPENTER

1043

Carpenter’s cellular service provider pursuant to a request under the
Stored Communications Act, rather than a warrant.202 Carpenter
challenged the admission of the CSLI evidence, arguing a warrant was
required to obtain it.203 The Supreme Court agreed.204
The Court claimed its holding to be a narrow one, simply
declining to extend the third-party doctrine as established in Smith and
Miller to CSLI, because CSLI reveals a “detailed chronicle of a
person’s physical presence compiled every day, every moment, over
several years. Such a chronicle implicates privacy concerns far beyond
those considered in Smith and Miller.”205 But the Court went
significantly further, recognizing that “technology has enhanced the
Government’s capacity to encroach upon areas normally guarded from
inquisitive eyes,”206 and continuing a line of reasoning introduced in
Kyllo v. United States,207 and continued in Riley v. California,208 that
sought to “preserv[e] . . . that degree of privacy against government
that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.”209
The Court in Kyllo held that law enforcement’s use of a thermal
imager to detect heat consistent with marijuana cultivation emanating
from the defendant’s home was a search requiring a warrant, even
though investigators never entered the home.210 The Court explained
that obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any
information regarding the interior of the home that could not
otherwise have been obtained without physical “intrusion
into a constitutionally protected area,” constitutes a search—
at least where (as here) the technology in question is not in
general public use. This assures preservation of that degree
of privacy against government that existed when the Fourth
Amendment was adopted.211
In Riley, the Court based its holding—that law enforcement
needed a warrant to search the contents of a cell phone incident to
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 2223.
Id. at 2220.
Id. at 2214.
533 U.S. 27 (2001).
573 U.S. 373 (2014).
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2214 (quoting Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34).
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34.
Id. at 34–35 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961)).
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lawful arrest—on a recognition that cell phones contain information
that is not only quantitatively much greater but qualitatively different
than what might be traditionally on an arrestee’s person at the time of
arrest.212 Because cell phones collect “many distinct types of
information—an address, a note, a prescription, a bank statement, a
video—that reveal much more in combination than any isolated
record,” because their storage capacity allows them to retain
information stretching back to when the phone was first acquired, and
because of the pervasiveness of cell phones in modern life, the Court
recognized the implications of modern technology on privacy in the
information age.213
The Court’s reasoning in Carpenter is a direct continuation of
Kyllo and Riley. By combining its concern for the potential for
“seismic shifts in digital technology” to erode Fourth Amendment
privacy interests recognized since the founding, with its wellestablished recognition that “individuals have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the whole of their physical movements,”214
the Court determined that not all information is the same, and one has
not automatically lost all expectation of privacy in certain types of
information just because it is retained by a third party.215
2. The Carpenter Criteria
In finding CSLI to be a distinct category of information, the Court
recognized three characteristics that distinguished it from more
traditional types of information generally subject to the third-party
doctrine. In so doing, the Court established criteria that can be applied
to determine whether other types of digital information might be
similar in nature and thus excepted from third-party doctrine. These
criteria have provided some guidance to lower courts when
determining whether to extend Carpenter’s holding to other factpatterns.216

212. Riley, 573 U.S. at 393.
213. Id. at 394.
214. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219, 2217.
215. Id. at 2219 (“The Government thus is not asking for a straightforward application of the
third-party doctrine, but instead a significant extension of it to a distinct category of information.”).
216. See Naperville Smart Meter Awareness v. City of Naperville, 900 F.3d 521, 527 (7th Cir.
2018).
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First, the information in question must be of a “deeply revealing
nature.”217 Like GPS surveillance, or the contents of a cell phone,
CSLI “provides an intimate window into a person’s life, revealing not
only his particular movements, but through them his ‘familial,
political, religious, and sexual associations.’ These location records
‘hold for many Americans “the privacies of life.”’”218
Second, the information must be of a certain “depth, breadth, and
comprehensive reach.”219 The Court focused on the common practice
of individuals carrying their cell phones at all times, likening them to
ankle monitors that can “achieve[] near perfect surveillance.”220 The
Court also focused on “the retrospective quality of the data,”
explaining that when the Government decides to acquire a person’s
CSLI records, it “can now travel back in time to retrace a person’s
whereabouts,” and is only limited by the policies of cellular providers
governing how long they retain such records.221 Further, because of its
retrospective nature, “police need not even know in advance whether
they want to follow a particular individual, or when.”222
Paul Ohm has explained this factor as follows:
Depth refers to the detail and precision of the information
stored. . . . In contrast, breadth refers to time in two ways:
how frequently the data is [sic] collected, and for how long
the data has [sic] been recorded. . . . Finally, comprehensive
reach refers to the number of people tracked in the
database. 223
He argues that this factor reflects the Court’s embrace and revival
of the mosaic theory, first articulated by the Court in Jones, which
recognizes that while a particular instance of short-term surveillance
may not amount to a search in isolation, many such instances in the
aggregate can reveal not only quantitatively more information, but a

217. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223.
218. Id. at 2217 (citations omitted).
219. See id. at 2223.
220. Id. at 2218.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Paul Ohm, The Many Revolutions of Carpenter, 32 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 357, 372–73
(2019) (emphasis in original).
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qualitatively different and more intimate kind of information, and thus
would constitute a search.224
Last, the collection of the information must be “automatic.”225
The Court noted that CSLI is “continually logged for all of the 400
million devices in the United States,” and because cell phones are such
an integral and pervasive part of life, “[o]nly the few without cell
phones could escape this tireless and absolute surveillance.”226
Legal scholars have articulated the criteria for applying
Carpenter to other types of digital information in varying ways,
formulating somewhat different tests and emphasizing certain criteria
over others. Paul Ohm articulates three factors derived directly from
the text of Carpenter to determine whether the information: “(1) has a
deeply revealing nature; (2) possesses depth, breadth, and
comprehensive reach; and (3) results from an inescapable and
automatic form of data collection.”227 He posits that to satisfy the third
factor, the data collection must be inescapable because it is a
byproduct of “services one needs to use to be a functioning member
of today’s society,” and automatic because users of the service cannot
refuse the data collection without forgoing use of the product or
service.228
Susan Freiwald and Stephen Smith articulate a variation on
similar factors.229 Their test analyzes “whether the technique was (1)
hidden, (2) continuous, (3) indiscriminate, and (4) intrusive.”230 Their
first factor, whether the technique is hidden, reflects the Court’s
concern that society would not reasonably expect law enforcement to
be secretly monitoring and recording every single person’s
movements over an extended period of time.231 In essence, this factor
embodies the traditional Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test.
The second factor, whether the technique is continuous, reflects the
Court’s concern with retrospectivity.232 The third factor, whether the
224. Id. at 373.
225. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223.
226. Id. at 2218.
227. Ohm, supra note 223, at 378.
228. Id. at 376–77.
229. See Susan Freiwald & Stephen Wm. Smith, The Carpenter Chronicle: A Near Perfect
Surveillance, 132 HARV. L. REV. 205, 219 (2018).
230. Id. (emphasis in original).
231. Id.
232. Id. at 220.
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technique is indiscriminate, looks at the pervasiveness of the
information collection, and whether it “poses the danger of
government fishing expeditions through databases,” reflecting the
Founders’ fear of general warrants.233 The fourth factor, intrusiveness,
is the equivalent of Paul Ohm’s “deeply revealing nature” factor, and
they similarly add “expense and efficiency” as a factor as well.234
Orin Kerr articulates a different test for applying Carpenter,
based on his theory of equilibrium-adjustment, which argues that
“[w]hen technology expands government power in a transformative
way, courts change the Fourth Amendment rules to restore preexisting
limits on that power.”235 This practice is evident in the Supreme
Court’s reasoning in Kyllo236 and Riley.237 Kerr argues that after
Carpenter, what triggers a search is not actually the content of the
information law enforcement acquires, but whether, because of a
“broader technological shift,” law enforcement can access today
records it could not access traditionally.238 “When technology enables
surveillance that could not occur before, the new surveillance becomes
a search. To avoid a dramatic increase in government power, the new
surveillance tools that digital technology creates are to be slotted into
the legal box of searches that require a warrant.”239

233. Id.
234. See id; see also Ohm, supra note 223, at 378.
235. ORIN S. KERR, THE DIGITAL FOURTH AMENDMENT,
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3301257 (forthcoming) (manuscript at 8)
(December 19, 2018 draft).
236. In Kyllo, the Supreme Court noted,
[O]btaining by sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the interior
of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical
“intrusion into a constitutionally protected area,” constitutes a search—at least
where (as here) the technology in question is not in general public use. This assures
preservation of that degree of privacy against government that existed when the
Fourth Amendment was adopted.
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505,
512 (1961)).
237. In Riley, the Supreme Court noted,
Today, by contrast, it is no exaggeration to say that many of the more than 90% of
American adults who own a cell phone keep on their person a digital record of
nearly every aspect of their lives—from the mundane to the intimate. Allowing the
police to scrutinize such records on a routine basis is quite different from allowing
them to search a personal item or two in the occasional case.
Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 395 (2014) (citation omitted).
238. KERR, supra note 235 (manuscript at 10).
239. Id.
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Kerr identifies three requirements for Carpenter to apply to a
particular type of record, thus necessitating a warrant for that record
to be searched, regardless of whether it is held by a third party. First,
“[t]he records must be of a kind and nature that generally could not be
collected in a pre-digital age.”240 Traditional records are still subject
to the traditional third-party doctrine, as the Court makes clear in its
holding.241 Second, the records must have been “created without the
subject’s meaningful voluntary choice,” or “inescapably . . . through
use of broadly-used services.”242 Last, the records must “reveal an
intimate portrait of a person’s life typically beyond legitimate state
interest.”243 According to Kerr, any information satisfying these three
criteria is subject to Carpenter protection, and the use by law
enforcement of “a digital technology . . . that was unavailable before
the digital age” to access such information is a search.244
3. Does Carpenter Protect Genetic Genealogy Information?
It is unlikely Carpenter affords Fourth Amendment protection to
information obtained from genetic genealogy investigations. The
information is clearly of a “deeply revealing nature.” It likely also
satisfies the “depth, breadth, and comprehensiveness” criterion.
However, the collection of the information by the database is not
“inescapable and automatic,” at least as pertains to the database user.
This deficiency would most likely prove fatal, precluding extension of
Carpenter to genetic genealogy database information, absent a
generous extension of the underlying policy concerns that led the
Court to its decision.
a. Deeply revealing nature
The information contained in genetic genealogy profiles, and the
information that can be gleaned from subsequent genealogical
research and attendant inferences, is easily as intimate as CSLI data,
if not more so. The Court in Carpenter was concerned about CSLI
data because of the intimate details of a person’s life that could be
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.

Id. (manuscript at 16).
See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2216–17 (2018).
KERR, supra note 235 (manuscript at 20).
Id. (manuscript at 22).
Id. (manuscript at 40).
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learned by combining a record of a person’s location over time with
other available information, and drawing inferences.245 Those
inferences could reveal “familial, political, professional, religious, and
sexual associations.”246
Here, by combining the wealth of genetic information contained
in the genetic profiles of a GEDmatch user and a related forensic
sample, with knowledge regarding the user’s degree of kinship with
his or her intermediary relatives on the family tree between the two,
law enforcement can glean deeply revealing information about the
entire familial line, including “predisposition for a particular disease
or other hereditary factors not relevant to identity.”247 Concerns raised
about the sensitivity of information that might be disclosed through
FDS, such as “abandoned parental bonds, adoptee relationships,
children conceived through technology, even family secrets about
paternal identity,”248 are even more pressing in the context of a
database like GEDmatch, where the genetic information stored is so
much more detailed.249
b. Breadth, depth and comprehensiveness
Genetic genealogy information likely also satisfies the “depth,
breadth, and comprehensive reach” requirement for Carpenter
protection. Applying Paul Ohm’s formulation of this requirement,
genetic genealogy information has the requisite depth because it is
highly detailed and precise, as discussed above. And while the CSLI
the Court considered in Carpenter was in actuality not all that
accurate, the Court took into consideration the rapid development of
the technology at issue and increases in accuracy certain to come.250
Similarly, the accuracy of genetic testing technology, and the level of
detail it can now reveal, has developed at a rapid clip, from the
inception of CODIS in December 1990, to the first cold case suspect
identified through genetic genealogy in April 2018, to more than forty

245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.

Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217 (citing United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012)).
Id. (quoting Jones, 565 U.S. at 415).
Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 464–65 (2013).
Murphy, Relative Doubt, supra note 98, at 315.
Ram, supra note 141, at 12.
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219.
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by mid-2019.251 There is no reason to suspect it will not continue to
improve.
Genetic genealogy data also likely have the requisite
comprehensive reach. The Carpenter Court noted there were, at the
time the case was decided, 400 million cell phones in use in the United
States, each of which essentially conveyed a log of its owner’s
movements to the service provider.252 While use of genetic genealogy
databases is nowhere near as pervasive, more than fifteen million
people have submitted their genetic information to at least one such
database, and geneticists currently predict that 60 percent of searches
of DNA of Americans of Northern European descent will yield at least
a third cousin, thereby making them identifiable when combined with
other demographic information.253 This percentage is expected to
jump to 99 percent within a few years.254 Thus it likely would be
considered sufficiently comprehensive in nature to satisfy this
requirement.
The “breadth” requirement, which refers to “how frequently the
data is [sic] collected, and for how long the data has [sic] been
recorded,”255 is inapplicable to genomic data. While genetic
information is only collected once per user, one’s DNA is static and
needs only be collected once to reveal all that it contains, unlike CSLI,
which reveals more information the longer and more frequently it is
recorded. Thus the “depth, breadth, and comprehensiveness”
requirement is satisfied.
c. Inescapable and automatic
Genetic genealogy information fails the Carpenter test because
its collection is not inescapable and automatic. This characteristic of
CSLI data was critical to the Court’s holding, as the Court was
considering whether the defendant’s (technically) voluntary
transmission of his location information to his service provider
resulting from his choice to carry a cell phone should destroy any
reasonable expectation of privacy he might otherwise have had in that
251. Zhang, supra note 31; Combined DNA Index System (CODIS), FBI,
https://www.fbi.gov/services/laboratory/biometric-analysis/codis (last visited June 23, 2020).
252. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218.
253. Erlich et al., supra note 200, at 690.
254. Id.
255. Ohm, supra note 223, at 372.
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information.256 In holding that it should not, the Court emphasized that
CSLI collection was inescapable because “cell phones and the services
they provide are ‘such a pervasive and insistent part of daily life’ that
carrying one is indispensable to participation in modern society.”257
And its collection was automatic because “a cell phone logs a cell-site
record by dint of its operation, without any affirmative act on the part
of the user beyond powering up.”258
Genomic data collection fails in both of these regards. Genetic
genealogy services are not a “pervasive and insistent part of daily life.”
People generally use these services out of curiosity, as a hobby. There
is certainly no need to do so to participate in modern society. Perhaps
an argument can be made that relatives of genealogy database users
had no input in the decision to upload the portions of their DNA that
they share with users, and therefore the collection of their genetic data
was inescapable. But this argument ignores what the Court found most
compelling about the inescapable and automatic nature of CSLI
collection: that it was an unavoidable byproduct of cell phone use,
which was necessary to participate in modern society. “Carpenter
applies to records that are necessarily created when a person uses core
technologies of the digital age. However, it does not apply to records
that a user might choose to create beyond what participation in modern
Internet life requires.”259
This requirement was also integral to the Seventh Circuit’s
reasoning in Naperville Smart Meter Awareness v. City of
Naperville,260 the only case thus far in which a federal circuit court has
found Carpenter to apply to government collection of digital data
other than CSLI.261 There, the Seventh Circuit found the city of
Naperville’s installation of “smart meters” in homes, which recorded
electricity consumption at fifteen minute intervals and stored the data
for three years, to constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment.262
Because different home appliances have “distinct energy-

256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.

Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217–18.
Id. at 2220 (quoting Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 385 (2014)).
Id.
KERR, supra note 235 (manuscript at 3).
900 F.3d 521 (7th Cir. 2018).
See id. at 527.
Id. at 524–25.
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consumption patterns or ‘load signatures,’”263 the smart meter data
revealed “intimate personal details of the City’s electric customers
such as when people are home and when the home is vacant, sleeping
routines, eating routines, specific appliance types in the home and
when used, and charging data for plug-in vehicles that can be used to
identify travel routines and history.”264 In analyzing whether the thirdparty doctrine applied, the only Carpenter requirement the court
addressed directly was whether the data collection was inescapable
and automatic.265 The Seventh Circuit determined Carpenter applied,
and thus the third-party doctrine did not, because residents of
Naperville could not choose not to have a smart meter installed in their
home without forgoing electricity altogether, declaring that “a choice
to share data imposed by fiat is no choice at all.”266 The court
elaborated:
If a person does not—in any meaningful sense—“voluntarily
‘assume the risk’ of turning over a comprehensive dossier of
physical movements” by choosing to use a cell phone, it also
goes that a home occupant does not assume the risk of near
constant monitoring by choosing to have electricity in her
home.267
Since this characteristic is wholly absent from genetic genealogy
data, this requirement would not be satisfied. Given its importance to
the Court’s reasoning in Carpenter, this deficiency likely means
genetic genealogy data obtained from consumer genomic services
would not be excepted from the traditional third-party doctrine under
Carpenter.
d. Efficiency, equilibrium-adjustment, and technological
equivalence
Under a strict application of the criteria the Court articulated in
Carpenter, genetic genealogy data accessed via consumer services
would not be afforded Fourth Amendment protection. But the Court’s
concern with the efficiency advantage afforded law enforcement in its
surveillance efforts by modern technologies—a thermal imaging
263. Id. at 524 (quoting Ramyar Rashed Mohassel et al., A Survey on Advanced Metering
Infrastructure, 63 INT’L J. ELECTRICAL POWER & ENERGY SYSS. 473, 478 (2014)).
264. Id.
265. Id. at 527.
266. Id.
267. Id. (citation omitted).
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camera in Kyllo, a GPS tracking device in Jones, a cell phone in Riley,
and CSLI data in Carpenter—clearly applies here. Consumer genetic
genealogy services represent a huge leap forward in law enforcement
surveillance capabilities, granting investigators access to what in
practice amounts to a genetic database of a large contingent of
Americans who have committed no crimes.
Prior to a sudden advance in surveillance technology, the
government’s ability to surveil is constrained by practical
considerations such as time, resources, and difficulty acquiring the
information sought.268 These constraints inform the types of
surveillance to which society might expect to be subjected.269 Sudden
and rapid advances in surveillance technology upset these
expectations.270 As the Court noted, prior to GPS and CSLI
technologies,
law enforcement might have pursued a suspect for a brief
stretch, but doing so “for any extended period of time was
difficult and costly and therefore rarely undertaken.” For that
reason, “society’s expectation has been that law enforcement
agents and others would not—and indeed, in the main,
simply could not—secretly monitor and catalogue every
single movement . . . for a very long period.”271
Moreover, the Court considered societal expectations of privacy
in conjunction with the “basic guideposts” of the Fourth Amendment
as understood by the Founders: “First, that the Amendment seeks to
secure ‘the privacies of life’ against ‘arbitrary power.’ Second, and
relatedly, that a central aim of the Framers was ‘to place obstacles in
the way of a too permeating police surveillance.’”272
Genetic genealogy investigations clearly implicate these
interrelated concerns. Society’s expectation of police surveillance
capabilities does not include the ability to search a genetic database
comprised of a large percentage of the American public. This is
evident by the level of public interest in the technique and the
investigations in which it has been utilized; the tenor of the
conversation surrounding it; and the backlash GEDmatch received
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.

United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 429 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).
Id. at 430.
See id.
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018) (quoting Jones, 565 U.S. at 430).
Id. at 2214 (citations omitted).
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when it contravened its own terms of service. These investigations
certainly seem to utilize a “permeating police surveillance” into “the
privacies of life.”
The Supreme Court’s attention to these concerns throughout its
case law applying the Fourth Amendment to advances in surveillance
technologies has informed two related but distinct theories of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence: equilibrium-adjustment and technological
equivalence.
Orin Kerr’s theory of equilibrium-adjustment posits that “[w]hen
new tools and new practices threaten to expand or contract police
power in a significant way, courts adjust the level of Fourth
Amendment protection to try to restore the prior equilibrium.”273 Kerr
declares Carpenter to be “a resounding win for the theory of
equilibrium-adjustment.”274 The Court’s reasoning in Carpenter was
that
[i]f the police can easily take investigative steps that far
exceed their powers in the past . . . that newfound ability
violates a reasonable expectation of privacy. . . . [T]he
question is whether technological change has rendered
obsolete a past expectation of a practical limit on government
power.275
Kerr points to a crucial shift in the Court’s reasoning from past
precedent: “Before Carpenter, the Katz test was about places and
things. The law asked whether government action violated a
reasonable expectation of privacy in a particular place or thing.
Carpenter asks a different question: Has technology changed
expectations of what the police can do?”276 He acknowledges the
importance of the information’s deeply revealing nature but argues
that
[t]he trigger for the search was not the details of what the
police learned about Carpenter in that particular case.
Instead, the trigger was the broader technological shift that
enabled the police to learn a lot about everyone who used a
273. Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV. L.
REV. 476, 480 (2011).
274. KERR, supra note 235 (manuscript at 1).
275. Id. (manuscript at 8).
276. Id. (manuscript at 7) (emphasis in original).
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cell phone—that is, everyone. It’s as if the technology
violated a reasonable expectation of privacy rather than the
government.277
The theory of technological equivalence similarly focuses on the
rapid development of surveillance technology and the effect it has on
society’s expectation of privacy as a whole.
At least seven justices of the Carpenter Court suggest a
heretofore unrecognized rule building on Kyllo: the rule of
technological equivalence. If a technology, or near-future
improvement, gives police the power to gather information
that is the “modern-day equivalent” of activity that has been
held to be a Fourth Amendment search, the use of that
technology is also a search.278
Paul Ohm argues that previously, “the Supreme Court has tended
to pay more attention to the nature of the police intrusion required to
obtain information than to the nature of the information obtained.”279
In Carpenter, however, the Court focused on whether there is a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the data themselves, viewed in
isolation.280 Critical to this analysis was whether this was information
previously accessible to law enforcement, either at all or without a
prohibitively expensive allocation of resources, prior to the advent of
the technology utilized to access the data.281 Ohm ties technological
equivalence to equilibrium-adjustment in arguing that the objective
prong of the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test should be purely
normative, rather than descriptive: courts should consider whether the
type and extent of surveillance made possible by a new technology are
acceptable to society, or whether they instead should be limited or
proscribed, without attempting to discern how society might actually
feel about the technology at that moment in time.282
Commercial genetic genealogy investigations and the data they
reveal fail a mechanical application of Carpenter because the data
collection is not inescapable or automatic, critical to the Court’s

277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.

Id. (manuscript at 10).
Ohm, supra note 223, at 359–60 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 362.
Id. at 362–63.
See id. at 367–68
Id. at 387–88.
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analysis in Carpenter and the extension of its holding to any new type
of database.283 Not only do users provide the information to the
databases voluntarily, they do so for the express purpose of making
connections to other users and investigating one’s family tree. But
genetic genealogy investigations by law enforcement trigger the same
broad concerns that inform equilibrium-adjustment and technological
equivalence. Indeed, this new investigative technique intuitively
seems like it should qualify for protection under Carpenter, for it has
raised serious privacy concerns amongst the public and sparked user
backlash against consumer genomic service providers that have
relaxed or violated their privacy policies by cooperating with law
enforcement.
Commercial genealogy databases greatly increase police power
to investigate crimes—not only decades’ old cold cases, but recently
committed crimes in real time—by utilizing what is rapidly becoming
the functional equivalent of a genetic database of a large portion of
Americans. Law enforcement in Centerville, Utah used the technique
to catch an assailant who was still at large only a few months after he
assaulted a woman at a local church.284 Investigations that took weeks
in early 2018 are now identifying suspects in a matter of days.285
Police power has clearly expanded in a very significant way. Under
the theory of equilibrium-adjustment, courts should be expected to
respond in kind to restore balance. It is reasonable to assume that
society’s current expectation is that police do not have access to a
database of the DNA of millions of people, who have committed no
crime, that police cannot utilize such database to identify them or their
relatives in the course of investigating a crime, while simultaneously
accessing a wealth of intimate biological information derived from
their genomes.
And the theory of technological equivalence should similarly
advocate for Fourth Amendment protection of commercial genomic
databases. Comparing a genetic sample retrieved at a crime scene to a
database of millions of Americans would have been inconceivable to
283. See id. at 376–77; Freiwald & Smith, supra note 229, at 219–20; KERR, supra note 235
(manuscript at 3).
284. Aldhous, supra note 80.
285. Megan Molteni, The Key to Cracking Cold Cases Might Be Genealogy Sites, WIRED
(June 1, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/police-will-crack-a-lot-more-cold-caseswith-dna/.

(10) 53.4_SELVIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

GENETIC GENEALOGY AFTER CARPENTER

8/2/20 6:50 PM

1057

the Founders. And as recently as 2013, the Supreme Court in King
emphasized that “[i]f in the future police analyze samples to
determine, for instance, an arrestee’s predisposition for a particular
disease or other hereditary factors not relevant to identity, that case
would present additional privacy concerns not present here.”286 The
dissent warned that law enforcement would be able to collect DNA
from individuals for even minor offenses and thereby build a national
database. 287 Indeed, private companies have created what will soon be
the functional equivalent of a national genetic database at law
enforcement’s disposal. Because genetic genealogy investigations
utilize a new technology to acquire information that just six years ago
the Supreme Court acknowledged, at least implicitly, would constitute
a search, the theory of technological equivalence says such
investigations should be treated as searches under the Fourth
Amendment.
While both equilibrium-adjustment and technological
equivalence seem to argue in favor of treating genetic genealogy
investigations as Fourth Amendment searches, the technique simply
does not fit the Carpenter test, and thus, absent further extension of
Carpenter by courts, would not constitute a search.
C. Assuming a Search—Is It Lawful?
Were courts to extend Carpenter such that forensic genetic
genealogy would constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment, the
technique would be lawful only if conducted pursuant to a warrant, or
if deemed reasonable by courts. Because obtaining a warrant would be
impracticable, if not impossible, courts would employ a balancing test,
weighing law enforcement interests against privacy interests,288 likely
finding such searches reasonable when employed to solve particularly
heinous crimes, but not lesser ones.
1. The Warrant Preference
First, while obtaining a warrant would make such a search
presumptively reasonable,289 courts would likely deem warrants to be
impracticable and therefore not required, notwithstanding that a judge
286.
287.
288.
289.

Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 464–65 (2013).
Id. at 481 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20–21 (1968).
See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2221 (2018).
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recently issued such a warrant for the first time. In July 2019, Judge
Patricia Strowbridge of the Ninth Judicial Circuit Court of Florida
issued a warrant to a Florida detective to override GEDmatch’s
recently enacted automatic opt-out privacy policy, thus allowing him
to search the entire database.290 Whether this constitutes an outlier or
the first of many remains to be seen. The actual warrant and
application have not been released publicly, but it is likely Judge
Strowbridge did not consider law enforcement’s use of GEDmatch to
be a search of records in which the users had a reasonable expectation
of privacy. Rather, she likely considered the GEDmatch database and
the genetic information contained therein to be GEDmatch’s
proprietary records, under the third-party doctrine, so the warrant was
likely written to override any objection GEDmatch might have made
to the search, without addressing the users at all. Probable cause was
likely supported solely by the success rate of such investigations in
identifying a suspect, currently 60 percent if the perpetrator is
Caucasian and of Northern European descent.291 This is concerning in
and of itself, for if law enforcement’s justification for accessing these
records is based on the third-party doctrine, an explicit opt-out should
counter that rationale.292 But if courts extend Carpenter to find that
GEDmatch users and their relatives have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in their genetic data, this line of reasoning would not hold up,
and obtaining a warrant would be impracticable, if not impossible.
There would be no way to describe the exact persons to be searched,
other than to search each of the millions of databased individuals,
much like the general warrants the Fourth Amendment was designed
to protect against.293

290. Hill & Murphy, supra note 12.
291. Erlich et al., supra note 200.
292. See Aaron Mak, We May Be Entering a New Era for Using Consumer Genetic Information
to Solve Crimes, SLATE (Nov. 8, 2019, 4:01 PM), https://slate.com/technology/2019/11/gedmatchwarrant-dna-ancestry-23andme.html (“‘Law enforcement has repeatedly asserted that the reason
it’s OK for them to use this kind of consumer genetics data is because it’s all voluntarily shared,’
says Natalie Ram, an associate law professor at the University of Maryland. ‘To then override an
explicit opt-out seems quite troubling.’”).
293. See, e.g., Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2213 (“The Founding generation crafted the Fourth
Amendment as a ‘response to the reviled “general warrants” and “writs of assistance” of the
colonial era, which allowed British officers to rummage through homes in an unrestrained search
for evidence of criminal activity.’” (quoting Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014))).
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2. Individualized Suspicion
Absent a warrant, courts must deem genetic genealogy
investigations reasonable to be lawful. But the lack of individualized
suspicion inherent in such searches poses a major impediment to
validating them based on a traditional reasonableness balancing
inquiry. For a search to be reasonable, the Fourth Amendment requires
some level of individualized suspicion—either probable cause or
reasonable suspicion—to support law enforcement’s belief that
searching the individual will lead to evidence of the crime being
investigated.294 Here, there would be none, as it would be impossible
for law enforcement to have any specific, articulable facts informing
a belief that the search of the profile of a specific person in the
database will yield a connection to an unknown perpetrator’s genetic
material. And, because these searches are for normal criminal
investigative purposes, they cannot readily be justified as special
needs searches, which do not require individualized suspicion.295
CODIS searches lack individualized suspicion in much the same
way as forensic genealogy searches, but are nonetheless considered
constitutional under King.296 But the Supreme Court in King
considered the search at issue to be the acquisition of genetic samples
from arrestees, not the practice of uploading those samples to CODIS
and looking for matching profiles.297 The Court accepted that the
primary purpose of DNA collection and storage was to more
accurately identify arrestees, rather than to generate leads in unsolved
crimes. Because the search was of an individual arrestee with a
diminished expectation of privacy, there was no individualized
suspicion issue, so the Court conducted a balancing test and found the
search reasonable.298
The dissent, however, correctly identified the primary state
interest in maintaining CODIS—matching unidentified genetic
evidence to databased individuals to identify suspects.299 Accordingly,
the dissent excoriated the majority for even conducting a balancing
294. See, e.g., City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000) (“A search or seizure is
ordinarily unreasonable in the absence of individualized suspicion of wrongdoing.”).
295. See id. at 41–42.
296. See Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 452 (2013).
297. Id. at 446.
298. Id. at 464.
299. Id. at 469 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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test in the first place, because “[n]o matter the degree of invasiveness,
suspicionless searches are never allowed if their principal end is
ordinary crime-solving.”300 Here, forensic genetic genealogy
investigations by law enforcement serve no plausible alternative
purpose other than criminal investigation that might allow a court to
get around a lack of individualized suspicion to even conduct a
reasonableness balancing test, and thus such searches should be
unlawful.
3. Reasonableness
Were a court to put aside the lack of individualized suspicion,
such searches would likely be found reasonable only when the crimes
at issue are particularly severe. The state interests in utilizing this
technique are compelling. There is a strong state interest in solving
crime, of course, and in particular especially violent crimes that have
proven unsolvable by traditional means. Moreover, the technique will
likely prove valuable in exonerating wrongfully convicted individuals
by buttressing evidence of mismatched DNA with compelling
evidence that someone else entirely was the actual perpetrator.
Further, solving decades-old cold cases can bring closure and
emotional relief to families that have suffered for years. And the
technique has already proven effective, reliable and efficient at doing
so. However, the state interests weaken as the crimes become less
severe and the need to solve them becomes less critical. They may
further weaken when traditional investigative techniques have not yet
been exhausted, and thus may still prove successful.
The privacy interests implicated are compelling as well, and
genealogical investigations can be quite intrusive. One’s genetic
information is intimate, detailed, and highly revealing. It can reveal
unknown or undisclosed personal traits, predisposition to diseases and
other ailments, and other private information. It can also reveal private
or unknown family relationships, which could prove devastating if
disclosed. Such information is certainly as revealing and thus as
intrusive as CSLI.301 Further, the technique casts suspicion on many
300. Id. (emphasis in original).
301. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217–18 (2018) (“[T]he time-stamped
data provides [sic] an intimate window into a person’s life, revealing not only his particular
movements, but through them his ‘familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual
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people for no reason other than an immutable genetic connection.
Such suspicion, and traditional forms of investigation that might
follow, can greatly affect one’s reputation, career, and personal
relationships.
Thus, balancing these competing interests, a court would likely
find forensic genetic genealogy investigations reasonable when the
state interests are strongest: when the crime at issue is particularly
severe, such as homicide and certain violent or sexual crimes, and
when all other investigative techniques have been exhausted. Under
these circumstances, the state interests are significantly stronger than
they were in Carpenter, and thus the balance would tip in favor of the
government. However, absent these circumstances, if forensic
genealogy were being used to investigate more common crimes right
after they occur, where traditional investigative techniques were still
available, then the reasonableness balancing analysis should track
Carpenter, and courts should find these searches to be unreasonable.
V. POLICY AND LEGISLATIVE CONSIDERATIONS
Law enforcement’s use of forensic genetic genealogy to
investigate crimes is not currently governed by any legislation or
regulations, and is proliferating rapidly.302 Given the sensitivity and
intimate nature of genetic information, how intrusive forensic genetic
genealogy investigations can be, and that the Fourth Amendment
likely provides no constraints under current jurisprudence, it is critical
that legislation be crafted to provide guidance and set boundaries.
Public sentiment regarding the practice is conflicted and unclear, and
database privacy policies alone are insufficient to provide adequate
protection of people’s private genetic information, especially if
warrants overriding such protections become more common.
Maryland has already introduced a bill banning the technique outright,
but it has not yet been enacted.303 Given the compelling state interests
the technique serves, the privacy concerns it implicates, and the
conflicted state of public sentiment regarding both, legislators and the
public at large must weigh a number of factors in order to properly
associations.’ These location records ‘hold for many Americans the “privacies of life.”’” (quoting
first United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 945 (2012) and then Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373,
403 (2014))).
302. Zhang, supra note 31.
303. See H.B. 30, 439th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2019).
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balance state and private interests and delineate acceptable parameters
for this method of criminal investigation.
Public sentiment regarding the technique is difficult to accurately
gauge. Two separate 2018 studies suggest the public supports law
enforcement’s use of their genetic data to solve particularly serious
crimes. The first, a self-published survey genealogist Maurice Gleeson
conducted of other genealogists, found that 85 percent of respondents
were “reasonably comfortable” when their DNA was being used to
solve homicides and serial rapes, but only 47 percent were supportive
when used to solve lesser crimes.304 A more formal study published in
October 2018 by a group of researchers led by Christina J. Guerrini at
the Center for Medical Ethics and Health Policy at Baylor College of
Medicine in Houston, Texas, contained similar findings:
Among the 1,587 respondents, the majority supported police
searches of genetic websites that identify genetic relatives
(79%) and disclosure of [direct-to-consumer] genetic testing
customer information to police (62%), as well as the creation
of fake profiles of individuals by police on genealogy
websites (65%). However, respondents were significantly
more supportive of these activities (all p < 0.05) when the
purpose is to identify perpetrators of violent crimes (80%),
perpetrators of crimes against children (78%), or missing
persons (77%) than when the purpose is to identify
perpetrators of nonviolent crimes (39%).305
The authors note they found the same pattern and rates of approval for
law enforcement use of CSLI.306
Yet the notion that the public overwhelmingly approves of law
enforcement’s use of everyone’s DNA to solve violent crimes is belied
by certain anecdotal evidence to the contrary. When FamilyTreeDNA
disclosed that it had agreed to grant the FBI access to its database on
a case by case basis, many of its users were outraged.307 “All in all, I

304. Tashea, supra note 90.
305. Christina J. Guerrini et al., Should Police Have Access to Genetic Genealogy Databases?
Capturing the Golden State Killer and Other Criminals Using a Controversial New Forensic
Technique, PLOS BIOLOGY (Oct. 2, 2018), https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pbio.2006906.
306. Id.
307. Salvador Hernandez, One of The Biggest At-Home DNA Testing Companies Is Working
with the FBI, BUZZFEED NEWS (Jan. 31, 2019, 8:52 PM),
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feel violated, I feel they have violated my trust as a customer,” one
user told Buzzfeed News, who first uncovered the cooperation
agreement, forcing the disclosure.308 Most other prominent consumer
genetic service providers do not cooperate with law enforcement, deny
requests for information, and resist subpoenas.309 23andMe released
the following statement when asked about the implications of the
Florida warrant: “We never share customer data with law enforcement
unless we receive a legally valid request such as a search warrant or
written court order. Upon receipt of an inquiry from law enforcement,
we use all practical legal measures to challenge such requests in order
to protect our customers’ privacy.”310 Such practices reflect a general
understanding amongst these companies that their customers would be
uncomfortable with routine use of their DNA in criminal
investigations, for it would certainly be easier and cheaper for these
companies to cooperate. And law enforcement practice reflects a
similar recognition of public unease. The law enforcement community
has admitted to being reluctant to use court orders to gain access to
commercial genealogy databases for fear of scaring users away.311
Public sentiment may turn not only on the severity of the crime
but on whether these investigations feel like contemporaneous and
pervasive surveillance. This, in turn, may be informed by whether the
crime being investigated was recently committed, or is old and cold.
User backlash, when GEDmatch violated its own terms of service to
allow law enforcement to access its database to solve the assault of a
woman in Utah, led it to institute its automatic opt-out policy.312 That
the crime at issue was less severe than what GEDmatch’s previous
terms of service allowed for—homicide or sexual assault—certainly
contributed to the user backlash.313 But the crime was nevertheless
severe: the perpetrator attacked a seventy-one-year-old woman in a
church and choked her until she lost consciousness.314 User backlash
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/salvadorhernandez/family-tree-dna-fbi-investigativegenealogy-privacy.
308. Id.
309. Hill & Murphy, supra note 12.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Aldhous, supra note 74.
313. See GEDMatch.Com Terms of Service and Privacy Policy, supra note 75 (version prior to
May 18, 2019 update).
314. Reavy, supra note 77.
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was likely also due to the real-time nature of the investigation. This
was not a decades-old cold case—the crime had been committed only
a few months prior to GEDmatch granting access, and the perpetrator
was still at large.315 Thus, the backlash was most likely the product not
only of the lessened severity of the crime, but also the sense of
pervasive surveillance that investigations such as this one take on,
where the crimes are fresh, the cases are active, and other investigatory
techniques have not yet been exhausted.
Last, people may feel comfortable with the idea of law
enforcement using their DNA to investigate crimes in the abstract, but
less so in practice, and so might respond positively to a survey but feel
violated when their own data are actually accessed and utilized.
Indeed, since October 1, 2019, only 185,000 GEDmatch users have
opted-in to allow law enforcement matching,316 indicating a lack of
enthusiasm, at best, for participating personally in these
investigations.
Given the unsettled and conflicted nature of public sentiment, and
past instances of commercial genetic genealogy companies failing to
properly anticipate their users’ reactions to decisions to either violate
their own terms of service or unilaterally change them, it is clear users
cannot rely on company privacy policies to provide sufficient
protection. While certain databases’ terms of service have thus far
provided robust protection, such as those of Ancestry and 23andMe,
which do not voluntarily cooperate with law enforcement and fight
court orders and subpoenas, others are far laxer. And even if a database
enforces a robust privacy policy, courts may decide to follow the lead
of Florida’s Ninth Judicial Circuit Court and issue warrants granting
law enforcement access. While GEDmatch did not challenge the
validity of the warrant, 23andMe has stated it would fight any warrants
it receives, and so a proliferation of warrants does not seem imminent
just yet. But even so, given the already unreliable nature of privacy
policies, and the possibility of more warrants, such policies do not
provide sufficient protection for database users’ and their relatives’
genetic data. Legislation is therefore needed.
Maryland is currently the only state to have proposed a bill that
would restrict law enforcement’s use of forensic genetic genealogy.

315. Id.
316. Hill & Murphy, supra note 12.
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Maryland House Delegate Charles Sydnor III introduced House Bill
30 at the first legislative session of 2019, which would have prohibited
law enforcement from utilizing commercial genetic databases in
criminal investigations entirely.317 The bill did not make it out of
committee, but Mr. Sydnor plans to introduce a revised version in
2020.318 “The policy in the state of Maryland is pretty clear: We
shouldn’t be doing this,” he has stated.319 Maryland is also one of only
two states with statutes prohibiting FDS.320
It seems unlikely, however, that a complete ban comports with
public sentiment either. Given the compelling need to solve
particularly heinous crimes, especially those that have been cold for
decades, a complete ban would be misguided. Rather, legislation
should be carefully crafted that seeks to properly balance the needs of
law enforcement to solve these crimes, with the privacy interests of
what will soon be the large majority of the American populace
identifiable through one of these databases. Legislation should, at least
initially, be drawn narrowly, so law enforcement can only access the
public’s sensitive genetic information in the most compelling of
circumstances. With time, as law enforcement becomes better skilled
at the technique, privacy safeguards are implemented and proven
effective, and the public becomes accustomed to widespread use of the
technique, use restrictions can be reevaluated, and perhaps loosened.
Any legislation will need to address the following considerations.
A. Type of Crime
Effective legislation governing law enforcement’s use of forensic
genetic genealogy to solve crimes must clearly define the crimes for
which law enforcement will be permitted to use the technique. Public
sentiment seems to draw the line at homicide and violent crimes. This
is reflected in both 2018 studies discussed above, as well as anecdotal
evidence. In both the study by Maurice Gleeson and the study by
Christina J. Guerrini, respondents overwhelmingly approved of law
enforcement’s use of their DNA to solve violent crimes, but support

317.
318.
319.
320.

H.B. 30, 439th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2019).
Tashea, supra note 90.
Id.
Ram, supra note 141, at 11.
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dropped by roughly half for nonviolent crimes.321 Moreover, before
GEDmatch instituted its automatic opt-out policy, its terms of service
made clear it allowed law enforcement use of the database to solve
“violent crime,” which it defined as “homicide or sexual assault.”322
GEDmatch’s 1.2 million users chose to entrust their genetic data to the
company under these conditions. But when GEDmatch allowed law
enforcement to search the database to investigate an aggravated
assault, user backlash ensued.
This calculation also reflects the inflection point where courts
would likely find the use of this technique, if deemed a Fourth
Amendment search, to be reasonable. Solving violent crimes is a
stronger state interest than solving nonviolent ones, and thus likely
outweighs the public’s privacy interests in its genetic information. For
nonviolent crimes, courts following Carpenter should find the balance
to track that which the Court at least implicitly struck between the
state’s interest in investigating serial robberies and the public’s
reasonable expectation of privacy in its CSLI data, and should
therefore find the use of forensic genealogy unreasonable in these
cases.
Accordingly, the line should, at least initially, be drawn at violent
crimes, as defined by GEDmatch’s prior terms of service—homicides
and sexual assaults. Because initial legislation should be as narrow as
possible, erring on the side of protecting privacy, and can be expanded
later as public sentiment shifts, the technique should also be limited to
investigating those sexual assaults in which the perpetrator is
implicated in multiple such crimes, rather than single crimes. While
this might prove controversial, such a requirement can always be
revised downward later, if supported by the public at large.
B. Time Elapsed Since Crime
Legislation should also limit use of forensic genetic genealogy to
investigate crimes that have gone cold for some defined amount of
time. Where to draw that line is a difficult question that will surely be
the subject of much debate, but society seems to be more comfortable
with law enforcement using commercial DNA databases to solve the
decades-old Golden State Killer case than to solve the months-old
321. Guerrini et al., supra note 305; Tashea, supra note 90.
322. GEDMatch.Com Terms of Service and Privacy Policy, supra note 75 (version prior to May
18, 2019 update).
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Washington aggravated assault. While the backlash against
GEDmatch in the Washington case was due in part to the crime being
less severe than the terms of service required, the contemporaneous
nature of law enforcement’s use of the service to identify a perpetrator
on the loose for a crime very recently committed has the feel of a more
pervasive surveillance that likely caused many people discomfort.
This will undoubtedly prove controversial as well. The need to
catch perpetrators who have recently committed violent crimes and are
still at large, and prevent them from striking again, is arguably greater
than the need to identify now-geriatric killers and rapists whose cases
have long since gone cold and most likely no longer pose an active
threat to society. But requiring a certain period of time to have lapsed
before law enforcement may utilize private DNA data prevents the
users from having the feel of contemporaneous surveillance. It would
also cause the purpose of the investigation to less closely resemble
regular run-of-the-mill crime fighting and instead resemble a special
needs search. The purpose of the search could be framed not as
ordinary criminal investigation to catch an offender currently posing a
danger to the public, but as bringing closure to victims’ families by
finally resolving long unsolved cases. While courts are more
comfortable with law enforcement searches absent individualized
suspicion if serving a special need other than ordinary criminal
investigation,323 it remains to be seen if such a distinction will matter
to the public, and therefore to legislators.
C. Exhaustion of Other Investigatory Techniques
Legislation should also require law enforcement to have
exhausted all traditional, reasonable investigative techniques before
turning to genetic genealogy. This would work in conjunction with a
minimum elapsed time requirement, affording law enforcement the
time needed to exhaust other techniques. This would ensure law
enforcement would only access people’s private, sensitive genetic data
in the most compelling of circumstances.
D. Training and Safeguards
Legislation should impose training and procedural requirements
on law enforcement to ensure genetic genealogical investigations are
323. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 41–42 (2000).
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narrow in scope and ethically conducted. Effective legislation must
also adequately safeguard sensitive genetic data and the intimate,
personal information that can be uncovered by digging into a person’s
family tree. Protective procedures should be implemented to ensure
private personal information, such as genetic predispositions for
certain diseases, or unknown or undisclosed familial relationships, is
not accidentally revealed during the course of an investigation, either
to a subject of investigation or publicly. Such accidental disclosures
can destroy reputations, careers, friendships and families, and must be
effectively prevented.
Moreover, training should focus on narrowing the scope of
genealogical investigations by teaching law enforcement agencies
how to properly conduct the most efficient investigation possible. This
would minimize the number of individuals upon whom suspicion is
cast, so as few people as possible are subjected to intrusive
investigation. Genealogist CeCe Moore has expressed support for an
industry certification requirement for genealogists conducting
criminal investigations, but support amongst her colleagues is weak.324
Effective legislation must impose such a requirement.
E. Evolution of Technology
Last, effective legislation must consider the rapid evolution of
forensic genetic genealogy technology and be adaptable accordingly.
Limits on the technique should start quite narrowly, erring on the side
of privacy protection. These limits may be relaxed over time, if
training and procedural safeguards prove effective and public
sentiment supports broadening the technique’s application. But as the
technology continues to become more efficient and cheaper, the
temptation to deploy it for lesser crimes will grow. As more people
continue to entrust their genetic data to these commercial databases,
and as algorithms improve to allow connections to fourth and fifth
cousins, instead of just third, the functional equivalent of a national
genetic database will emerge. Such developments would militate
against a loosening of the restrictions endorsed above. Ultimately,
legislators and the public will have to monitor the development of this
technology in order to ensure an acceptable balance between privacy
and law enforcement interests is maintained.
324. Tashea, supra note 90.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The use of commercial genetic genealogy in criminal
investigations is expanding rapidly, and the technique is quickly
becoming faster and more efficient. The existence of the functional
equivalent of a national genetic database is imminent, raising serious
privacy concerns, but also creating important tools for law
enforcement. Commercial genealogy service providers have
attempted to implement privacy policies that strike the proper balance
between governmental and personal privacy interests, but they have
proven inconsistent and unreliable. And the Fourth Amendment likely
does not apply, even under Carpenter. This is so even though the
technique greatly enhances law enforcement surveillance power in a
manner that should trigger an expansion of the Fourth Amendment
under the theories of equilibrium-adjustment and technological
equivalence. Absent such an expansion, it is critical legislation be
enacted to protect the wealth of intimate personal information that
genetic genealogy can reveal and prevent abuse by law enforcement.
Such legislation should initially be drawn narrowly, permitting law
enforcement to utilize the technique only to solve the most serious
crimes, after a prescribed period of time, and when all other methods
of investigation have been exhausted. Law enforcement should have
access to this incredibly potent tool, but only when absolutely
necessary. Thorough training and strict procedural protections must be
implemented, for genetic genealogical investigations should only be
permitted if the public’s privacy interest in its own intimate genetic,
biological, and personal information can be ensured.
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